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Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation is a tool of practical interest within proof the-
ory. Although it was initially conceived in the realm of Hilbert’s program, after
Kreisel’s fundamental work in the 1950’s it has become clear that Dialectica, as
well as other popular interpretations, can be used to extract explicit bounds and
approximations from classical proofs in analysis. The program that was then
started, consisting of using methods of proof theory to analyse and extract new
information from classical proofs, is called proof mining.
The first extension of the Dialectica interpretation to analysis was achieved by
Spector by means of a principle called bar recursion. Recently, Escardó and Oliva
presented a new extension using a principle called product of selection functions,
which provides a game-theoretic semantics to the interpreted theorems of analysis.
This eases the task of understanding the constructive content and meaning of
classical proofs, instead of only extracting quantitative information from them.
In this thesis we present the Dialectica interpretation and its extensions to
analysis, both using bar recursion and the product of selection functions. A whole
chapter is thus devoted to exposing the theory of sequential games by Escardó
and Oliva.
In [38], Oliva and Powell gave a constructive proof of the Dialectica inter-
pretation of the Infinite Ramsey Theorem for pairs and two colours using the
product of selection functions. This yields an algorithm, which can be under-
stood in game-theoretic terms, computing arbitrarily good approximations to the
infinite monochromatic set. In this thesis we revisit this paper, extending all the
results for the case of r colours, with r ≥ 2.
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Kurt Gödel presented his functional interpretation in a lecture in 1941 [21] within
the context of Hilbert’s program. His recent incompleteness theorems had ended
the search for finitistic proofs of the consistency of arithmetic, but had started
the search for relative consistency proofs.
It was known, as Kolmogorov [28], Gödel [19], and Gentzen [16,17] had proved
independently, that the consistency of Peano arithmetic (PA) reduces to the
consistency of its intuitionistic counterpart, known as Heyting arithmetic (HA),
via a negative translation assigning to each formula of arithmetic A, another
formula AN , in such a way that PA ` A↔ AN and furthermore, if PA ` A then
HA ` AN . The relative consistency proof comes from the fact that the translation
of falsum is falsum, and hence if PA proves a contradiction, so does HA.
The Dialectica interpretation —as Gödel’s functional interpretation was called
after the name of the journal where it was first published [20]— defines, for each
formula A of the language of arithmetic, a formula AD of the form ∃x∀yAD(x, y),
where AD is a formula of a quantifier-free system in all finite types, called T. The
so-called soundness theorem for the Dialectica interpretation guarantees that if
HA ` A, then there is a term t of system T, which can be effectively extracted
from the proof of A in HA, such that T ` AD(t, y). Again, the interpretation
of falsum is falsum; therefore, if HA is inconsistent, so is T. The benefit lies, in
Troelstra’s words [45], in the fact that “if T is regarded as embodying evident
principles, this can be regarded as a consistency proof for HA”. By compos-
ing a negative translation from PA to HA with the Dialectica interpretation, a
consistency proof for classical arithmetic is obtained relative to T.
Gödel already suggested in [20] that system T could be extended to a system
with quantifiers in all finite types, and a proof of relative consistency for anal-
ysis could be achieved by extending his interpretation by means of “the sort of
inference that Brouwer used in proving the fan theorem”.
Indeed, system T extends to various systems of arithmetic with quantifiers
in all finite types. Among them, the most convenient for the Dialectica inter-
pretation is a system called WE-HAω (WE stands for weakly extensional, due to
the treatment of equality), to which one can add the law of excluded middle to
get a classical counterpart WE-PAω. Adjoining some non-constructive principles
to WE-PAω, such as comprehension over numbers and choice for quantifier-free
formulas, one gets a system capable of formalizing most of classical analysis.
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Clifford Spector, using a principle of bar recursion BR inspired by Brouwer’s
fan theorem, achieved in [43] an extension of the ND-interpretation, i.e., the
interpretation that consists of applying N first and D second, to a system of
analysis as described above. That is, he proved that from a proof of a theorem
from classical analysis, formalized in the system above, one can effectively extract
a term t of WE-HAω + BR such that WE-HAω + BR ` (AN)D(t, y).
Meanwhile, in a series of articles [29–33] of the 1950’s, Kreisel advocated for
a “shift of emphasis” from relative consistency proofs to term extraction. He
intuited that mathematical proofs carry hidden information besides the truth
of their corresponding theorem, and that the application of methods of proof
theory, not only Gödel’s functional interpretation but also others like Hilbert’s
ε-substitution method and his own no-counterexample interpretation, to classical
proofs from analysis, would help to extract this information. He launched a
program which he called “unwinding of proofs”, and he actually obtained the
first primitive recursive bounds for Artin’s solution to Hilbert’s 17th problem
using these methods [8, 36].
Although a number of term extractions were achieved, the program became
less and less popular due to the lack of other applications. However, in the 1990’s
and 2000’s, due to the refinement of some interpretations by U. Berger and H.
Schwichtenberg [4,5], and to the monotone variant of the Dialectica interpretation
proposed and successfully used by U. Kohlenbach [23–25], Kreisel’s ideas were
reborn. The program that started since this rebirth is called proof mining, after
a suggestion of Dana Scott to Kohlenbach [26,37].
Recently, the proof mining program began to focus not only on term extraction
but also on the constructive meaning of the extracted proof. This is especially
difficult when an instance of Spector’s bar recursion appears, due to the abstruse
nature of this principle. Thus, the effort of some proof theorists has focused
on providing a clear and comprehensible semantics to bar recursion. In this
context, Mart́ın Escardó and Paulo Oliva [10–13] came out with a new theory
of sequential games. They envisaged a principle of recursion called product of
selection functions, or EPS, which allows for computing optimal strategies in
their sequential games and, moreover, is equivalent to bar recursion.
This new principle has been used to replace bar recursion and to study the
constructive content of several classical theorems, such as the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem in [39] and the Infinite Ramsey Theorem for pairs in [38].
The aim of this thesis is to give an insight into proof mining, concretely into
the combination of the negative translation with the Dialectica interpretation,
and its extension to analysis by means of the new game-theoretic principle of
EPS. To this end, besides the exposition of all the theoretic content needed,
we devote a great effort to a practical case study: we revisit [38], extending the
results for the Infinite Ramsey Theorem for pairs and two colours to the case of
r colours, with r ≥ 2, and laying emphasis on the significance of the constructive
content of the classical proof.
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Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1 establishes some preliminary results and conventions. Section 1.1
presents the basic definitions of classical and intuitionistic first-order logic, while
Section 1.2 defines the systems of classical and intuitionistic arithmetic PA and
HA. Section 1.3 gives a general idea of what a proof interpretation is, while Sec-
tion 1.4 presents one of the variants of the negative translation between classical
and intuitionistic first-order logic and arithmetic. Finally, Section 1.5 establishes
some notational conventions to be used in the sequel.
Chapter 2 is devoted to presenting the Dialectica interpretation of arithmetic.
Section 2.1 presents Gödel’s system T. Section 2.2 gives a motivated definition
of the Dialectica interpretation. The original version of the soundness theorem
is moreover stated. Then, we move to Section 2.3 to present some extensions of
HA and PA to systems with quantifiers in all finite types, and we state some im-
portant results about our preferred intuitionistic extension, WE-HAω, to which
an extension of Dialectica is possible. Finally, Section 2.4 presents again the def-
inition of the Dialectica interpretation, this time over WE-HAω and emphasizing
the types of the resulting variables, and gives soundness and characterization
theorems.
In Chapter 3, we discuss what principles should be added to our system of
arithmetic in all finite types in order to get a system capable of formalizing
analysis. Section 3.1 shows that it is possible to reduce the ND-interpretation
of those principles to the D-interpretation of DNS, the principle of the double
negation shift. We also give a sufficient condition for three terms to witness
DNSD. In Section 3.2, we present the definition of Spector’s bar recursion, and
we prove two basic lemmas about it. Finally, in Section 3.3 we show how bar
recursion can be used to construct terms satisfying the sufficient condition of
Section 3.1. We end the chapter with a theorem stating the extension of the
ND-interpretation to our system of analysis.
Then, we move to Escardó and Oliva’s new theory of sequential games in
Chapter 4. Section 4.1 gives the definition of the most simple kind of sequential
games, those whose length is finite and fixed. Section 4.2 presents the fundamen-
tal notion of selection functions and their product. This product, when extended
to the case of finite games with unbounded length, will be strong enough to re-
place bar recursion in the extension of Dialectica to analysis. In Section 4.3 we
show how the product of selection functions can be used to compute optimal
strategies in sequential games. Section 4.4 presents some applications of these
notions to different areas of standard mathematics. Section 4.5 is devoted to ex-
plaining how the product of selection functions can be extended to a dependent
version of sequential games, in which the goal of the game or the possible moves
at each round may depend on the development of the previous rounds. In Section
4.6 we present the variant of sequential games in which the number of rounds is
not fixed at the beginning of the play. Finally, Section 4.7 gives the definition of
EPS and shows how it can be applied to find optimal strategies of the unbounded
variant of sequential games.
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Chapter 5 continues the discussion from Chapter 3, this time extending the
Dialectica interpretation using EPS instead of bar recursion. Section 5.1 gives
the main theorems on EPS, which will be extensively used in the sequel. In
Section 5.2 the extension of Dialectica using EPS is achieved. Section 5.3 states
the equivalence between EPS and bar recursion. In Section 5.4, we present the
game-theoretic intuition behind the interpretation of DNS, and we explain what
the advantages of EPS over bar recursion are.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we follow [38] to extract constructive content from the
proof of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. We extend the proof given in [38], which is
restricted to the case of 2 colours, to the case of r colours for r ≥ 2. The structure
of Chapter 6 is as follows. Section 6.1 gives preliminary well-known definitions
and theorems. In Section 6.2 we present a classical proof formalized to a certain
extent. In Section 6.3 we show how the statements of Ramsey’s theorem and other
principles used translate via the ND-interpretation. Section 6.4 presents the proof
of Ramsey’s theorem using several instances of EPS to interpret intermediate
steps. In Section 6.5, we present a summary of the construction, which is actually
an algorithm for approximating the infinite set whose existence is claimed by
Ramsey’s theorem. Finally, Section 6.6 explains the game-theoretic intuition
behind each use of EPS.
What is new?
For the sake of transparency, we state here which parts of this thesis are new
contributions.
The main original component is the extension of the interpretation and con-
structive proof of Ramsey’s theorem from the 2-colour case of [38] to the case of
r colours for r ≥ 2. In particular, the proofs of Proposition 6.15 and of Theorem
6.30 are new. Of course, the rest of Chapter 6 has been adapted to this case.
Other small contributions are meant to make the exposition more accessible.
In this direction, we have adapted and worked out some of the contents of this
thesis. For instance, in Section 2.4 we explicitly give the types of the variables
resulting from the Dialectica interpretation, a detail that is not usual in the liter-
ature. In Chapter 4, we present several examples in order to clarify and motivate
the concepts to introduce. Finally, in Chapter 6 we work out all the details.
In Section 6.3 we show how the ND-interpretation is computed and simplified
in practice, something that was done, but not explained, in [38]. The structure
of Subsection 6.4.2 is also different from the corresponding part of the original
paper, focusing on clarifying what the order of the steps of the construction is at
the expense of a bit of redundancy. The summary of Section 6.5 differs from [38]




1.1 Intuitionistic and classical first-order logic
In this section we present the basic definitions of first-order logic, and the axioms
and rules of systems IL and CL, i.e., intuitionistic logic and classical logic. Our
presentation here follows closely [26].
The language of first-order logic consists of the logical constants ∧, ∨, →, ⊥,
∃, ∀; countably-many variables x, y, z, . . .; for any arity n ≥ 0 a possibly empty
countable set of function symbols (with arity 0 they are called constants), and
for any arity n ≥ 1 a possibly empty countable set of predicate symbols. There
is also a symbol for equality, =.
Definition 1.1. Terms are recursively defined as:
(i) Variables and constants are terms;
(ii) If t0, . . . , tn−1 are terms and f is an n-ary function symbol, then ft0 . . . tn−1
is a term.
Terms not containing variables are called closed.
Now we can use equality and predicate symbols to combine terms into atomic
formulas.
Definition 1.2. Atomic formulas are defined as:
(i) ⊥ is an atomic formula;
(ii) If s, t are terms, then (s = t) is an atomic formula;
(iii) If t0, . . . , tn−1 are terms and P is an n-ary predicate symbol, then Pt0 . . . tn−1
is an atomic formula.
Finally, we define formulas.
Definition 1.3. Formulas are recursively defined as:
(i) Atomic formulas are formulas;
(ii) If A,B are formulas, then (A ∧B), (A ∨B), (A→ B) are formulas;
(iii) If A is a formula and x is a variable, then (∃xA), (∀xA) are formulas.
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The outermost parentheses are usually dropped. We will use the abbreviations
¬A := A→ ⊥, A↔ B := (A→ B) ∧ (B → A).
We use the following convention on parentheses: negation and quantifiers bind
stronger than ∨,∧, which bind stronger than →,↔. Moreover, → associates to
the right, that is, A→ B → C means
(
A→ (B → C)
)
.
The definition of free and bound variables, and of free and bound occurrences
of variables, is as usual. Given a term t, a variable x, and a formula A, we define
A[t/x] as the formula obtained by substituting all free occurrences of x by t in A,
also as usual. Moreover, we say that t is free for x in A, or that the substitution
of t for x in A is free, if there is no free occurrence of x in A inside the scope of
a quantifier bounding a variable of t. We assume that all the substitutions that
we perform are free, via renaming of bound variables if necessary.
The axioms and rules of intuitionistic first-order logic IL are now presented.
Most of them are to be understood as axiom schemata over all formulas A, B or
all function or predicate symbols f , P . We write EFQ for ex falso quodlibet.
∨-contraction : A ∨ A→ A;
∧-contraction : A→ A ∧ A;
∨-weakening : A→ A ∨B;
∧-weakening : A ∧B → A;
∨-permutation : A ∨B → B ∨ A;
∧-permutation : A ∧B → B ∧ A;
EFQ : ⊥ → A;
∃-quantifier : A[t/x]→ ∃xA (where t is free for x in A);
∀-quantifier : ∀xA→ A[t/x] (where t is free for x in A);
=-reflexivity : x = x;
=-symmetry : x = y → y = x;
=-transitivity : x = y ∧ y = z → x = z;
=-functional : x0 = y0 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1 = yn−1 → fx0 . . . xn−1 = fy0 . . . yn−1;
=-relational : x0 = y0 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1 = yn−1 → Px0 . . . xn−1 → Py0 . . . yn−1.




A→ B B → CSyllogism ;
A→ C
A ∧B → CExportation ;
A→ B → C
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A→ B → CImportation ;
A ∧B → C
A→ BExpansion ;
C ∨ A→ C ∨B
B → A∀-rule , where x is not free in B;
B → ∀xA
A→ B∃-rule , where x is not free in B.∃xA→ B
This ends the definition of system IL.
Classical first-order logic CL is obtained from IL by adding the schema of the
law of excluded middle:
LEM : A ∨ ¬A.
1.2 Heyting and Peano arithmetic
Heyting arithmetic HA is defined over intuitionistic first-order logic with a con-
stant 0 (zero), a function symbol S (successor), and function symbols for all
(derivations of) the other primitive recursive functions. The axioms added are
the successor axioms:
Sx 6= 0, Sx = Sy → x = y,
the axiom schema of complete induction:





and the defining equations for the primitive recursive functions. The concrete
way to do this last step is not relevant here and we omit it. For further details
we refer the reader to [44, Section 1.3]. We emphasize, however, that all these
defining axioms are quantifier-free formulas.
Peano arithmetic, also known as classical arithmetic, is obtained from HA by
adding the law of excluded middle schema
LEM : A ∨ ¬A.
1.3 Proof interpretations
Proof interpretation is the name received by a wide range of different notions,
with different goals and applications, from proving relative consistency of theories
to extracting explicit bounds from a proof of classical analysis. Here we try to
explain what one can expect when facing a so-called proof interpretation. This
section does not present any formal definitions, the vocabulary used is intended
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just for intuition, and the only technical or official terms are those which appear
in boldface.
Given two formal systems S and T , a proof interpretation is a (usually re-
cursive) translation from formulas of S to formulas of T . A bit more precisely,
it is a way of uniformly obtaining a formula A′ of system T given a formula A of
system S. The formula A′ is usually defined by induction on the logical structure
of A.
For a proof interpretation to be meaningful, the translation has to relate both
systems in some deep way. When defining a proof interpretation, two kinds of the-
orems are usually presented: the soundness theorem and the characterization
theorem.
Soundness theorems have a form similar to:
For all formulas A of the language of S,
if S + C + Γ ` A, then T + Γ′ ` A′.
Here C and Γ are collections of formulas of the language of S, which we call
principles, because they are not derivable from S, but they are accepted in some
contexts of interest. The collection Γ′ consists of all formulas B′ for B ∈ Γ. The
reason for having two different sets of principles is that the translations of the
principles of C are not needed in T in order to prove A′. In fact, they usually
vanish under the proof interpretation, that is, for every C ∈ C, C ′ is a valid
formula in T .
Characterization theorems have a form similar to:
For all formulas A of the language of S,
U + P ` A↔ A′.
Here U is a formal system that includes the language of S and the language
of T , and P is a collection of principles.
In this thesis we will present a so-called negative translation, which gives an
interpretation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, and where the languages
of both theories are equal, so no extra theory U will be needed. Moreover, we
develop the Dialectica interpretation in two settings, but the characterization
theorem is presented only in a context where the languages of both theories are
also equal, so again no mix of languages will be needed.
1.4 The negative translation
A negative translation is a way of obtaining from a theorem A of classical logic,
a theorem AN of intuitionistic logic such that, moreover, in classical logic we can
prove A ↔ AN . This is inspired by the fact that there exists such a translation
for propositional logic. If CPL is the system of classical propositional logic and
IPL is the system of intuitionistic propositional logic, Glivenko’s theorem [18] tells
us that if CPL ` A, then IPL ` ¬¬A, and of course CPL ` A ↔ ¬¬A. Actually,
Glivenko’s theorem is stronger, as it states that CPL ` A if and only if IPL ` ¬¬A.
For a detailed presentation of CPL and IPL we refer the reader to [46].
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However, in first-order logic the trick of just double-negating all formulas does






which is not intuitionistically valid (for a proof see [42, Proposition 8.5.3]).
There are several variants of the negative translation. The first one is due
to Kolmogorov [28], and it consists of double-negating all subformulas of the
original formula. A few years later, Gödel [19] and Gentzen [16,17] independently
presented similar translations. Later others appeared, due for instance to Kuroda
[35]. We use here one of the variants proposed by Kuroda, which is used in [26]
as well. All variants turn out to be equivalent, not only in CL, which is obvious,
but in IL, in the sense that, given a formula A of classical logic, if A′ is one of
the translations and Ǎ is another one, then IL ` A′ ↔ Ǎ. For a proof of this fact
see [15].
Definition 1.4. Let A be a formula in (an extension of) the language of CL.
Define AN := ¬¬A∗, where A∗ is defined by induction on the logical structure of
A as:
(i) A∗ := A for atomic A;
(ii) (A B)∗ := A∗ B∗ for  ∈ {∧,∨,→};
(iii) (∃xA)∗ := ∃xA∗;
(iv) (∀xA)∗ := ∀x¬¬A∗.
The soundness and characterization theorems for this translation are well-
known. A detailed proof can be found in [15].
Theorem 1.5 (Soundness). Let Γ be a set of principles in the language of CL
and A a formula in the same language. If CL + Γ ` A, then IL + ΓN ` AN .
In particular, we have that:
Corollary 1.6 (Soundness for arithmetic). If PA ` A, then HA ` AN .
Proof. Notice that PA is CL + S + ∆ + IND, where S stands for the axioms
for the successor, and ∆ is the set of defining axioms of all primitive recursive
functions; and HA is IL+S+ ∆ + IND. Given A such that PA ` A, we know that
IL + SN + ∆N + INDN ` AN . To see that HA ` AN , it will be sufficient to show
that SN , ∆N and INDN are provable in HA. This is clear for SN and ∆N , since










Since IL ` B → ¬¬B and IL ` ¬¬(B → C) → (¬¬B → ¬¬C), it suffices to
prove:





And this is true simply because HA contains the induction schema, in particular
HA contains the induction axiom for ¬¬A∗(x).
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Moreover, we have the characterization theorem:
Theorem 1.7 (Characterization). For all formulas A in the language of CL,
CL ` A↔ AN .
This yields directly:
Corollary 1.8 (Characterization for arithmetic). For all formulas A in the lan-
guage of PA, PA ` A↔ AN .
1.5 Notational conventions
Throughout the following chapters, we will work with finite and (countably) in-
finite sequences. Depending on the framework, sequences may be differently
formalized.
When working in the framework of standard mathematics, we will make use
of the Cartesian product. Given a natural number n and sets X0, . . . , Xn−1, we
consider the elements s :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi as finite sequences. An infinite sequence may
be α :
∏∞
i=0Xi for sets Xi for each i ∈ N, or, in the case where all elements of
the sequence are elements of the same set X, α : N → X. Moreover, we use the
notation X∗ for the set of all finite sequences of elements of X.
When working in a formal system in all finite types, as the ones presented in
the following chapter, we will not have product types, but we will still use N→ X
as a type of infinite sequences (which will actually be written 0 → σ, as we will
see), and sometimes the informal type σ∗ of finite sequences over type σ, which
will be in fact an abbreviation of an encoding of finite sequences using an actual
type of our formal system. See Remark 5.2.
In both frameworks, we write sequences in angle brackets, as in 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉.
The letter s is usually used for sequences, especially finite, while α is usually used
for infinite sequences. Other letters are in boldface when they denote sequences,
for instance, x or a. To denote the ith element of a sequence s, we write si or
s(i).
Let s be a finite sequence of length n, let t be a finite sequence of length m
and α an infinite sequence. We use the following notations:
〈〉 ≡ the empty sequence.
|s| ≡ the length of s.
s ∗ t ≡ the concatenation of s and t, i.e.,〈s0, . . . , sn−1, t0, . . . , tm−1〉.
s ∗ α ≡ the concatenation of s and α, i.e.,
(s ∗ α)(i) = s(i) for i < n, (s ∗ α)(i) = α(i− n) for i ≥ n,
s ≡ s ∗ 0.
Moreover, for any sequence s of length at least n, infinite or finite:
[s](n) ≡ 〈s0, . . . , sn−1〉.
s, n ≡ [s](n) ∗ 0.
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Here 0 is an infinite sequence of elements that will depend on the context: it
may be the zero of the corresponding type, or it may be a canonical element of
the corresponding set, as we will announce in each case.
By an abuse of notation, when s is a finite sequence of elements of some set
or type X and a is an element of X, we write s ∗ a instead of s ∗ 〈a〉.
Furthermore, if we have a function f : X → (Y → Z) and x : X, we sometimes
write fx instead of f(x). If f :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → Y and s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi for k < n, then fs is
defined by fs(t) = f(s∗ t) for all t :
∏n−1
i=k Xi, i.e., fs is f partially evaluated on s.
The same applies if f :
∏∞
i=0Xi → Y and s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi. We define fs(t) = f(s ∗ t)






Gödel’s functional interpretation of arithmetic, also called Dialectica interpreta-
tion after the name of the journal where it was first published [20] in 1958, was
in fact conceived years before, as two lectures by Gödel in 1938 [22] and 1941 [21]
make clear.
The Dialectica interpretation takes arbitrary formulas A of Heyting arithmetic
to formulas of the form ∃x∀yAD(x, y), where AD is quantifier-free, of a system
with higher types. As we shall see in this chapter, the original complexity of the
quantifiers of the formula is converted into complexity of the types of x and y.
The original goal of the functional interpretation was to achieve a proof of con-
sistency for arithmetic. As Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem had shown, a
finitistic proof of the consistency of PA is impossible, since even PA is incapable of
proving its own consistency. It was known, however, that the negative translation
reduces the consistency of PA to that of HA. Gödel’s intention with Dialectica
was to provide a consistency proof for arithmetic relative to the consistency of T,
his system in all finite types without quantifiers. To this end, it is shown that if
HA ` A, then there is a term t such that T ` AD(t, y). Since the interpretation
of ⊥ is ⊥, this shows that if HA is inconsistent, then so is T.
Spector [43] extended the Dialectica interpretation to an interpretation of a
system capable of formalizing classical analysis, by means of a principle called bar
recursion that we present in Chapter 3. A relative consistency proof for analysis
was thus achieved too.
However, Kreisel, in a series of publications [29–33] in the 1950’s, promoted a
shift of emphasis. He realized that the extraction of a term witnessing, in some
sense, a classical theorem, was of practical interest. He started a program of term
extraction from classical proofs which he called “unwinding of proofs” and which
involved the use of several interpretations, Dialectica among them.
These ideas experimented a rebirth in the 1990’s and 2000’s, due to the work
of U. Berger and H. Schwichtenberg [4, 5], and U. Kohlenbach [23–25]. This
rebirth has been called proof mining.
In Section 2.1 we present the formal system T. Section 2.2 presents the defi-
nition of the Dialectica interpretation and gives a motivating discussion. Finally,
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 extend Dialectica to a system of arithmetic in all finite types
and with quantifiers, which will be useful for our purposes within proof mining.
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2.1 Gödel’s system T
The set of all finite types T is generated inductively as:
(i) 0 ∈ T .
(ii) If σ, τ ∈ T , then (σ → τ) ∈ T .
There are many alternative notations for σ → τ around in the literature, such as
(σ, τ), τσ, (σ)τ , (τ)σ, etc. The intended reading is that 0 represents the type of
the natural numbers, while (σ → τ) represents a type of some kind of functions
from σ to τ .
As usual, we omit parentheses when no confussion is possible, always under-
standing that → associates to the right.
Some presentations of system T add a third way of defining types:
(iii) If σ, τ ∈ T , then (σ × τ) ∈ T .
As one may expect, (σ × τ) is intended to be the cartesian product of σ and
τ . However, this condition can be eliminated by currying , that is, interpreting
any type (σ × τ) → ρ as σ → τ → ρ. Officially, we do not take condition (iii),
but sometimes it is used as notational abbreviation of the longer curried version.
The pure types are defined recursively as:
• (0) = 0.
• (n+ 1) = (n)→ 0.
We drop parentheses when the context makes clear that we are dealing with
pure types.
Gödel’s system T is a quantifier-free theory over the finite types T . The lan-
guage of T includes countably-many variables xσ, yσ, zσ, . . . for each type σ ∈ T .
When it is clear from the context, we will omit the superscript. The logical con-
stants are the usual connectives ∧,∨,→,⊥. Regarding equality, there are several
different options that can be adopted. Here we take the intensional decidable
original version from [20]. For each type σ, there is an equality symbol =σ. We
will discuss other options in Section 2.3.
We now define inductively the set of terms of T together with the relation
t : σ, read “term t is of type σ”:
(i) Every variable xσ is a term of type σ.





(iii) There are the following constants:
• 0 : 0.
• S : 0→ 0.
• For all types σ, τ , Πσ,τ : σ → τ → σ.
• For all types ρ, σ, τ , Σρ,σ,τ : (ρ→ σ → τ)→ (ρ→ σ)→ ρ→ τ .
• For all types σ, Rσ : σ → (0→ σ → σ)→ 0→ σ.
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The intended interpretation is that 0 denotes the number zero, S denotes the
successor function and Π,Σ and R are type combinators and recursors that will




is to be understood
as the result of applying the function t to the argument s. For the sake of brevity,
we sometimes drop parentheses and write t(s) or ts. When application is iterated,
for instance, if we have t : ρ→ σ → τ , r : ρ, s : σ, we write t(r)(s), t(r, s) or even




(s), that is, we understand that application associates to
the left.
Each type σ can be written as σ0 → . . . → σn−1 → 0 for some natural
number n and some types σ0, . . . , σn−1. This can be verified by a straightforward
induction.
The formulas of T are inductively defined as:
(i) ⊥ is a formula.
(ii) For each type σ and terms t, s : σ, t =σ s is a formula.
(iii) If A,B are formulas, then A ∧B, A ∨B, A→ B are formulas.
The axioms of T are those of classical propositional logic, together with the
equality axioms:
t =σ t,
t =σ s ∧ A[t/x]→ A[s/x],
and the following defining equations for the constants:
Sx0 6=0 0,
Sx0 =0 Sy











Notice that Πσ,τ can be understood as a first projection, while Σρ,σ,τ combines
its arguments in a way that will allow for defining λ-abstraction in Section 2.3.
Finally, the recursor Rσ performs the usual definition by recursion:
h(n) =
{
f if n = 0,
g(k, h(k)) if n = k + 1.




and a rule allowing for the substitution of arbitrary terms for variables of the
same type:
A , where t and x have the same type.
A[t/x]
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2.2 The Dialectica interpretation
This section is devoted to defining an interpretation (in the sense of Section 1.3)
from HA into system T. Its main aim is to provide the reader with the intuition
on why the Dialectica interpretation is defined as it is, and so sometimes the
treatment is not entirely formal. The following sections will approach this topic
in our preferred setting, namely a system of arithmetic with quantifiers over all
finite types.
From a formula A in the language of HA, we will obtain a formula:
AD = ∃x∀yAD(x,y),
where x and y are (possibly empty) tuples of variables of any type, and AD is
a (quantifier-free) formula of T. The free variables of AD are exactly the free
variables of A. The variables in x,y and their types only depend on the logical
structure of A. Moreover, AD does not contain disjunctions.
Definition 2.1. Given a formula A in the language of HA, AD and AD are
inductively defined as follows:
(i) AD := AD := A for atomic A.
If AD = ∃x∀yAD(x,y) and BD = ∃u∀vBD(u,v), then:





(iii) (A ∨B)D := ∃z,x,u ∀y,v
((




z 6= 0→ BD(u,v)
))
.





(v) (∃zA(z))D := ∃z,x∀yAD(x,y, z).
(vi) (∀zA(z))D := ∃X∀y, zAD(Xz,y, z).
The interpretation of ∃zA(z) is clear, while (∀zA(z))D is intuitive if one
skolemizes the formula:
∀z∃x∀yAD(x,y, z).
Similarly, the following skolemization gives intuition about (A→ B)D.
































The order of the steps above is important because it tries to minimize the use
of non-constructive principles. A detailed discussion on how the other choices are
worse can be found in [26].
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Although we do not include this discussion here, we analyse however which
non-constructive principles are used by the above. First of all, we notice that
stating the needed principles requires the use of quantifiers over higher types. So
for the moment we will suppose that we have some extension of T that allows
such quantifiers. We will see in the next section that there are in fact several
such extensions, and in Section 2.4 we will study the behaviour of D over one of
these systems.
Steps (2.1) and (2.3) are constructively valid. Steps (2.5) and (2.6) make use
of the axiom of choice:
AC : ∀x∃yA(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀xA(x, Y x),
where A ranges over arbitrary formulas, and x, y are variables of arbitrary types.
Moreover, AC justifies the skolemization in the case (∀zA(z))D.










where A and B range over arbitrary formulas and x is of any type, not free in A.










where A0 is quantifier-free and u is of any type.
Finally, step (2.4) is justified if we accept Markov’s principle:
MP : ¬¬∃xA0(x)→ ∃xA0(x),






Using that AD, BD are quantifier-free, it is known (see [26]) that, over intuition-






and then by MP we complete step (2.4).
The next natural step would be to prove the soundness and characterization
theorems for this interpretation. However, it is convenient for our purposes to
postpone this step until a formal system of arithmetic with quantifiers over higher
types is presented. The considerations on this section about AC, IP∀, and MP
will justify the characterization theorem for Dialectica over that system.
For an extensive treatment of Dialectica over HA, the reader is referred to [1].
In any case, the soundness theorem in this setting is as follows:
Theorem 2.2 (Gödel [20]). Let A be a formula in the language of HA. If HA
proves A, then there is a tuple of terms t such that T proves AD(t,y). Moreover,
t can be effectively extracted from the proof of A in HA.
From PA, we can go first to HA via the negative translation, and then apply
the Dialectica interpretation. Theorem 2.2 together with Corollary 1.6 yields:
Theorem 2.3 (Gödel [20]). Let A be a formula in the language of PA. If PA
proves A, then there is a tuple of terms t such that T proves (AN)D(t,y).
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2.3 Systems of arithmetic in all finite types
Here we present systems of arithmetic extending HA to languages with all finite
types. In fact, these systems are different versions of T adding quantifiers over
types. Our presentation follows [44].
We first describe system N-HAω, where the N is for neutral, as it has no
treatment of equality. The language of N-HAω is very similar to that of T, but
adding quantifiers. For the sake of clarity, we present it again in detail.
The language of N-HAω includes countably-many variables xσ, yσ, zσ, . . . for
each type σ ∈ T . For each type σ, there is an equality symbol =σ. The logical
constants are the usual connectives ∧,∨,→,⊥ and quantifiers ∀xσ,∃xσ for each
variable xσ, type σ ∈ T . Finally, we have constants like above, 0 : 0; S : 0 → 0;
Πσ,τ : σ → τ → σ; Σρ,σ,τ : (ρ → σ → τ) → (ρ → σ) → ρ → τ ; and Rσ : σ →
(0→ σ → σ)→ 0→ σ, for all types σ, τ, ρ.
In N-HAω we have the same terms as in T.
Definition 2.4. The formulas of N-HAω are inductively defined as:
(i) ⊥ is a formula;
(ii) For each type σ and t, s : σ, t =σ s is a formula;
(iii) If A,B are formulas, then A ∧ B, A ∨ B, A → B, (∀xσA), (∃xσA) are
formulas.
The axioms and rules of N-HAω are:
(a) All the axioms and rules of IL presented in Section 1.1, except the equality
axioms, ranging over formulas of N-HAω.




σ → yσ =σ xσ,
xσ =σ y
σ ∧ yσ =σ zσ → xσ =σ zσ,
xσ =σ y
σ → zσ→τxσ =τ zσ→τyσ,
xσ→τ =σ→τ y
σ→τ → xσ→τzσ =τ yσ→τzσ.
(c) The induction schema IND, now ranging over all formulas of the language.
(d) The defining axioms for S,Π,Σ and R that we have seen in T.
System N-HAω is a basic system that can be extended in several different ways
depending on the desired treatment of equality. In general, equality between ob-
jects of higher types (for instance, functions) can be interpreted as intensional
or extensional . The idea is that two functions are extensionally equal if they
yield equal outputs from equal inputs; they are intensionally equal if their defi-
nitions are syntactically equal in some sense depending on the particular setting.
Intensional equality is usually taken to be decidable.
What follows is a description of systems I-HAω (intensional), E-HAω (exten-
sional) and WE-HAω (weakly extensional). System WE-HAω is the most usual
in contexts where the Dialectica interpretation appears since it is a suitable ex-
tension for the proof of soundness to work.
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I-HAω
From N-HAω we define a system I-HAω where the intended meaning of equality
is intensional. As discussed above, intensional equality should be decidable. We
add for each type σ a constant Eσ : σ → σ → 0, and axioms:
Eσx
σyσ =0 0↔ xσ =σ yσ,
Eσx
σyσ =0 0 ∨ Eσxσyσ =0 S0.
This implies decidability of equality at all types.
E-HAω and E-PAω




x =σ→τ y ↔ ∀zσ(xz =τ yz)
)
.
But, for the purposes for which E-HAω is used, it is more convenient to have the
equality of type 0 as the only primitive one, and equality for all other types as a
defined notion:
xσ→τ =σ→τ y
σ→τ :≡ ∀zσ(xz =τ yz).
We keep all axioms of N-HAω, including the equality ones, now interpreted as
referring to our defined equality (some of them become redundant). Now exten-
sionality is expressed by the axiom:
xσ =σ y
σ → zσ→τxσ =τ zσ→τyσ (2.8)
Finally, E-PAω is obtained from E-HAω by adding the law of excluded middle
LEM for arbitrary formulas.
WE-HAω and WE-PAω
It turns out that the soundness theorem for the Dialectica interpretation does
not hold over system E-HAω because of the full extensionality axiom. For a
discussion on this see [26, pp. 126–127]. We will thus weaken extensionality.
System WE-HAω is obtained replacing the axiom of extensionality (2.8) by the
rule schema (with sσ, tσ, rτ ∈ T ):
A0 → s =σ t , where A0 is quantifier-free.
A0 → r[s/xσ] =τ r[t/xσ]
Finally, WE-PAω is obtained from WE-HAω adding the law of excluded middle
LEM for arbitrary formulas.
Now we give propositions stating that system WE-HAω is strong enough to
define λ-abstraction and some terms that will be useful later on. For proofs of
these facts the reader is referred to [26].
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Proposition 2.5. For every term t : τ of WE-HAω, there is a term (λxσ.t) :
σ → τ , whose free variables are exactly those of t except for x, such that for
every term s : σ,
WE-HAω ` (λxσ.t)(s) =τ t[s/x].





, and analogously for any number of nested λ-abstractions.
For each type σ = σ0 → . . .→ σn−1 → 0, we define the following term:




Proposition 2.6. Let A0(x) be a quantifier-free formula of the language of
WE-HAω whose free variables are among x = 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉. Then there is a
closed term tA0 such that:
WE-HAω ` ∀x
(
tA0x =0 0↔ A0(x)
)
.
The quantifier-free law of excluded middle is defined as:
QF-LEM : A0 ∨ ¬A0,
where A0 ranges over quantifier-free formulas.
Corollary 2.7. WE-HAω ` QF-LEM, that is, for every quantifier-free formula
A0 of WE-HA
ω,
WE-HAω ` A0 ∨ ¬A0.
We also can do definition by cases:
Proposition 2.8. For every type σ ∈ T , there is a closed term t of WE-HAω
such that:
WE-HAω ` ∀z0, xσ, yσ
(
(z =0 0→ tzxy =σ x) ∧ (z 6=0 0→ tzxy =σ y)
)
.
Moreover, the negative translation as presented in Section 1.4 is also sound
in WE-HAω. We understand now that the quantifiers of Definition 1.4 are over
any type. Then we have:
Theorem 2.9 ([15, Theorem 2.9]). Let Γ be a set of principles in the language
of WE-PAω and A a formula in the same language. If WE-PAω + Γ ` A, then
WE-HAω + ΓN ` AN .
2.4 The Dialectica interpretation on WE-HAω
As we have seen, the Dialectica interpretation of a formula A has the form
∃x∀yAD(x,y). The boldface x and y indicate that they are tuples, that is,
the form of AD is actually
∃x0 . . . ∃xn−1∀y0 . . . ∀ym−1AD(x0, . . . , xn−1, y0, . . . , ym−1).
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Each of these variables is possibly of higher type, so in fact we have:
∃xσ00 . . . ∃x
σn−1
n−1 ∀yτ00 . . . ∀y
τm−1
m−1 AD(x0, . . . , xn−1, y0, . . . , ym−1).
In this case, we will write, just as a metamathematical abbreviation, x : σ
and y : τ , and the formula becomes ∃xσ∀yτAD(x,y). Moreover, if ρ is a type,
we will also write things like xρ→σ abbreviating xρ→σ00 , . . . , x
ρ→σn−1
n−1 ; and x
ρ→σzρ




0 , . . . , z
σ0→...→σn−1→τm−1
m−1 ,
while x(σ→τ )→σ means x0, . . . , xn−1 where for i = 0, . . . , n− 1:
xi :
(
σ0 → . . .→ σn−1 → τ0
)
→ . . .→
(
σ0 → . . .→ σn−1 → τm−1
)
→ σi.
Remark 2.10. The awkward definitions for tuples introduced above can be
avoided just by allowing product types, as Section 2.1 discusses. However, we
choose here the alternative that keeps the definition of our systems the simplest.
It is well-known that, using pairing functions, our version of system WE-HAω is
capable of coding tuples of variables into a single one and we will make use of this
fact in some future cases in order to avoid even the tuple notation above when it
becomes so tedious that it makes proofs incomprehensible. For details see [44].
Now we present the definition of the Dialectica interpretation over system
WE-HAω. The definition is as Definition 2.1, but here we are explicit about the
types of the variables.
Definition 2.11. Given a formula A in the language of WE-HAω, we inductively
define another formula in the same language AD := ∃x∀yAD(x,y), where AD is
a quantifier-free formula without ∨. The free variables of AD are that of A. The
variables in x,y and their types only depend on the logical structure of A.
(i) AD := AD := A for atomic A.
If AD = ∃xσ∀yτAD(x,y) and BD = ∃uµ∀vνBD(u,v), then:





(iii) (A ∨B)D := ∃z0,xσ,uµ ∀yτ ,vν
((
z = 0→ AD(x,y)
)
∧(
z 6= 0→ BD(u,v)
))
.





(v) (∃zρA(z))D := ∃zρ,xσ∀yτAD(x,y, z).
(vi) (∀zρA(z))D := ∃Xρ→σ∀yτ , zρAD(Xz,y, z).
Remark 2.12. We notice that for any formula A in the language of WE-HAω, we
have (AD)D = AD (up to renaming of bound variables). Hence, by the definition
of D, when computing AD we can apply D to some subformula first; for example,
for any formulas A,B, we have (A→ B)D = (AD → BD)D.
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Since our final aim is to interpret theorems of classical analysis, we will need
to apply the negative translation before the Dialectica interpretation. Therefore,
the Dialectica interpretation of a double-negated formula will be often needed, so
we compute it in general terms:
Remark 2.13. The Dialectica interpretation of the negation and double negation
is as follows:
(a) (¬A)D = ∃Y σ→τ ∀xσ¬AD(x,Y x).
(b) (¬¬A)D = ∃X(σ→τ )→σ ∀Y σ→τ¬¬AD
(
XY ,Y (XY )
)
, which in WE-HAω
is equivalent to ∃X(σ→τ )→σ ∀Y σ→τAD
(
XY ,Y (XY )
)
.
Now we are ready to give soundness and characterization theorems for the
Dialectica interpretation over WE-HAω. A purely universal sentence is a formula
of the form ∀xA0, where A0 is a quantifier-free formula whose free variables are
among the ones in x.
Theorem 2.14 (Soundness of the Dialectica interpretation, Gödel [20]). Let P
be a set of purely universal sentences in the language of WE-HAω. Let A(a) be
a formula in the language of WE-HAω containing only a free. Then, if
WE-HAω + AC + IP∀ + MP + P ` A(a),
then there is a tuple of terms t of WE-HAω such that
WE-HAω + P ` ∀yAD(ta,y,a).
Moreover, t can be effectively extracted from a proof of the assumption.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation. Using
Propositions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8, the proof goes along as mostly routine.
For instance, assuming that AD = ∃xσ∀yτAD(x,y), the first axiom of IL is
treated as follows:
∨-contraction : A ∨ A→ A.
(A∨A→ A)D = ∃X ′′,Y Y ′ ∀z0,x,x′,y′′((















x if z = 0
x′ otherwise,
tY := λazxx
′y′′.y′′ =: tY ′ .
The only difficulty arises in the treatment of the seemingly harmless axiom of
∧-contraction:
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∧-contraction : A→ A ∧ A.
(A→ A∧A)D = ∃Y ,X ′,X ′′ ∀x,y′,y′′(
AD(x,Y xy












The idea is that tY takes witnesses of the failure of AD(x,y
′) ∧AD(x,y′′) to
a witness of the failure of AD(x, tY axy
′y′′). We are witnessing, therefore, the
contrapositive of the axiom, and that is allowed because the law of the excluded
middle holds for quantifier-free formulas.
Another remarkable case is the induction schema, which is easily interpreted
using the recursors R. The principles AC, IP∀ and MP are mapped to tautologies
by the Dialectica interpretation, more precisely to formulas of the form (A→ A)D.
The complete proof can be found in [26].
Theorem 2.15 (Characterization of the Dialectica interpretation, [1, 26, 44]).
For every formula A in the language of WE-HAω, we have:
WE-HAω + AC + IP∀ + MP ` A↔ AD
Proof. An easy induction. The ideas have been presented in Section 2.2.
As we have discussed, we can combine the negative translation with the Di-
alectica interpretation. We first need another version of Theorem 2.9. Let QF-AC
be the axiom schema of choice, AC, restricted to quantifier-free formulas:
QF-AC : ∀x∃yA0(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀xA0(x, Y x),
where A0 ranges over quantifier-free formulas (of the language of WE-HA
ω), and
x, y are variables of arbitrary type.
Proposition 2.16 ([26, Proposition 10.6]). Let P be a set of purely universal
principles in the language of WE-PAω and A a formula in the same language. If
WE-PAω + QF-AC + P ` A, then WE-HAω + QF-AC + P + MP ` AN .
Proof. It is known (see [26]) that for P ∈ P , using that P is purely universal, we
get WE-HAω ` P ↔ PN . If we prove that WE-HAω +QF-AC+MP ` (QF-AC)N ,
then by Theorem 2.9 the result follows.
Given a quantifier-free formula A0, we have that the negative translation of
∀x∃yA0(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀xA0(x, Y x) is:
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¬¬
(
∀x¬¬∃yA0(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀x¬¬A0(x, Y x)
)
,
which, since A0 is quantifier-free, is equivalent to:
¬¬
(
∀x¬¬∃yA0(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀xA0(x, Y x)
)
,
so it is sufficient to prove:
WE-HAω + QF-AC + MP ` ∀x¬¬∃yA0(x, y)→ ∃Y ∀xA0(x, Y x),
and this is clear by QF-AC and MP.
The above proposition allows for combining N and D.
Theorem 2.17 ([26, Theorem 10.7]). Let P be a set of purely universal sentences
in the language of WE-HAω. Let A(a) be a formula in the language of WE-HAω
containing only a free. Then, if
WE-PAω + QF-AC + P ` A(a),
then there is a tuple of terms t of WE-HAω such that
WE-HAω + P ` ∀y(AN)D(ta,y,a).
Moreover, t can be effectively extracted from a proof of the assumption.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 2.16 and Theorem 2.14.
Chapter 3
Interpretation of analysis: an
extension of Dialectica with bar
recursion
It is known that most parts of classical analysis can be formalized in full second
order arithmetic. It is thus palpable why an extension of the Dialectica inter-
pretation into a functional interpretation of a system containing second order
arithmetic was presented shortly after the first publication of Gödel’s paper [20].
This was achieved by Spector in [43], following an idea already present in Gödel’s
paper. The extension of Dialectica for classical analysis was then seen as a means
for a relative consistency proof, but has since shown to be very useful for the
proof mining program, as its proof of soundness gives an algorithm for extracting
bounds from proofs.
Our system of classical analysis will be WE-PAω + QF-AC + CA0, where CA0
denotes the schema of full comprehension over numbers:
CA0 : ∃f 1∀x0
(
fx =0 0↔ A(x)
)
,
where A is an arbitrary formula and f is not free in A.
In this chapter we will see an interpretation of system WE-PAω+QF-AC+CA0
using Spector’s bar recursion, a principle which, although capable of this task,
has been regarded as an obscure way to make the proof of soundness work. This
is in part the reason why the proof mining program has been mainly focused on
explicit term extraction and not on the meaning of the interpreted theorem and
proof. In following chapters, we present a recent alternative to bar recursion,
given in several papers by Escardó and Oliva [10–13], which tries to fix this issue
by means of a game-theoretic reading of the functional interpretation, opening
the possibility of understanding the constructive content of classical proofs in
analysis.
Our presentation closely follows [26].
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3.1 Principles for analysis
Instead of giving a direct interpretation of CA0, in Proposition 3.1 we observe
that, in the presence of classical logic and the restricted schema of choice:
QF-AC0,0 : ∀x0∃y0A0(x, y)→ ∃f 1∀x0A0(x, fx),
where A0 ranges over quantifier-free formulas, the schema CA
0 is equivalent to:
AC0,0 : ∀x0∃y0A(x, y)→ ∃f 1∀x0A(x, fx),
where A ranges over arbitrary formulas.
Proposition 3.1. Over WE-PAω + QF-AC0,0, the schemata CA0 and AC0,0 are
equivalent.
Proof. Assume CA0. To prove AC0,0, let A(x, y) be any formula. We apply CA0
to A(x, y) (using a pairing function):
∀x0, y0
(
g(x, y) =0 0↔ A(x, y)
)
.
Therefore, ∀x0∃y0A(x, y) is equivalent to ∀x0∃y0
(
g(x, y) = 0
)
, and hence, using
QF-AC0,0, we get ∃f 1∀x0
(
g(x, fx) = 0
)
, which is equivalent to the required:
∃f 1∀x0A(x, fx).
Conversely, assume AC0,0. Let A(x) be any formula and f 1 a variable not free
in A(x). We shall prove ∃f 1∀x0
(
fx = 0↔ A(x)
)
. In WE-PAω we have:
∀x0∃n0
(
n = 0↔ A(x)
)
,
since we have LEM. Applying AC0,0 to this formula we get:
∃f 1∀x0
(
fx = 0↔ A(x)
)
.
What we will prove, as Spector did, is that the axiom schema of countable
choice AC0 can be ND-interpreted using bar recursion. The schema AC0 is defined
as the union of the schemata AC0,σ for every type σ, where:
AC0,σ : ∀x0∃yσA(x, y)→ ∃f 0→σ∀x0A(x, fx).
The negative translation of this reads:
¬¬
(
∀x0¬¬∃yσA∗(x, y)→ ∃f 0→σ∀x0¬¬A∗(x, fx)
)
.
Using that, intuitionistically, ¬¬(B → C) is equivalent to B → ¬¬C, we get that
over WE-HAω the above is equivalent to:
∀x0¬¬∃yσA∗(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f 0→σ∀x0¬¬A∗(x, fx).
The double negation shift, which is intuitionistically underivable, is the schema
ranging over arbitrary formulas A:
DNS : ∀x0¬¬A(x)→ ¬¬∀x0A(x).
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Proposition 3.2. WE-HAω + AC0 + DNS proves (AC0)N .
Proof. Given a formula A(x0, yσ), we have to prove:
∀x0¬¬∃yσA∗(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f 0→σ∀x0¬¬A∗(x, fx). (3.1)
Applying AC0 to the formula A∗, since (B → C) → (¬¬B → ¬¬C) holds
intuitionistically, we obtain:
¬¬∀x0∃yσA∗(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f 0→σ∀x0A∗(x, fx). (3.2)
By DNS, ∀x0¬¬∃yσA∗(x, y) implies ¬¬∀x0∃yσA∗(x, y), which by (3.2) implies
¬¬∃f 0→σ∀x0A∗(x, fx). Since intuitionistically it holds that B → ¬¬B, we get
(3.1) as required.
Therefore, we have reduced the functional interpretation of (AC0)N to that of
DNS.





and contracting the existential tuple of variables
into u and the universal tuple into v, as explained in Remark 2.10. Let DNS(A)
be the statement of DNS applied to the formula A, i.e.,
∀x0¬¬A(x)→ ¬¬∀x0A(x).
Assume that tx, tW and tV are terms containing only U, Y, Z as free variables,
and that for all U, Y, Z, the following are satisfied:
tx = Y (tW )
U(tx, tV ) = tW (Y (tW ))
tV (U(tx, tV )) = Z(tW ).
(3.3)
Then, tx, tW and tV are witnesses of DNS(A)
D.




∀x¬¬∃u∀vAD(x, u, v)→ ¬¬∀y∃w∀zAD(y, w, z)
)D
=(
∀x∃U∀V ¬¬AD(x, UV, V (UV ))→ ¬¬∃W∀y, zAD(y,Wy, z)
)D
=(
∃U ∀x, V ¬¬AD
(

















Y (WY Z),WY Z(Y (WY Z)), Z(WY Z)
)))D
36 Interpretation of analysis: an extension of Dialectica with bar recursion
We do not write the last step because it is almost incomprehensible for a
human reader. But, recalling the justification for the definition of (A → B)D
given in Section 2.2, we know that the witnesses for this interpretation are terms










Y (tW ), tW (Y (tW )), Z(tW )
))
.
Therefore, it is sufficient for the terms to satisfy (3.3).
3.2 Spector’s bar recursion
We extend system WE-HAω by new constants






0→ (0→ σ)→ τ
)
→(
0→ (0→ σ)→ (σ → τ)→ τ
)
→ τ.
for any types σ and τ , together with the following defining axioms:
BRσ,τ :

ω(s, n) <0 n→ Bσ,τnsωgφ =τ gn(s, n),
ω(s, n) ≥0 n→ Bσ,τnsωgφ =τ
φ
(





s : 0→ σ,
ω : (0→ σ)→ 0,
g : 0→ (0→ σ)→ τ,
φ : 0→ (0→ σ)→ (σ → τ)→ τ.
Recall that here s, n refers to [s](n)∗00→σ, i.e., sequence s cut at n and extended
with zeros.
BR is the schema formed by BRσ,τ for all types σ, τ . In WE-HA




ω(s, n) < n
)
. (3.4)
For a discussion on models of bar recursion, see [26]. Here, it is enough
to observe that (3.4) actually makes sense if we think of ω as a computable
functional, since then ω just sees a finite part of s, say [s](m) for some natural
number m. Therefore, ω(s) = ω(s,m) = ω(s, k) for any k ≥ m, and hence taking
n := max{m,ω(s)}+ 1, we get:
ω(s, n) = ω(s,m) = ω(s) < n.
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s, n if ω(s, n) < n
SBRσ(Sn)([s](n) ∗ a)ωε otherwise,





This can be defined from Bσ,0→σ by:
SBRσnsωε :=0→σ Bσ,0→σnsωgε̌,
where gns := s, n and for each i : 0,
ε̌nspi :=
{
s(i) if i < n
p(εnp)i otherwise.
That is, ε̌nsp is the sequence [s](n) concatenated with 〈p(εnp)〉i≥n.
Notice that, by definition, if i < n we have that:
SBRσnsωεi = s(i). (3.5)
Notation 3.4. Sometimes we write SBRω,εσ ns instead of SBRσnsωε.
The following two lemmas, also due to Spector, will be useful to give solutions
to (3.3). Let us write n′ for Sn.
Lemma 3.5. Given ω : (0 → σ) → 0 and ε : 0 →
(
σ → (0 → σ)
)
→ σ, let
α := SBRω,εσ 0
000→σ. Then, for all n : 0,
α = SBRω,εσ n(α, n).
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. The case n = 0 is clear by definition. Now
assume n ≥ 0 and let us prove it for n′. The inductive hypothesis says:
α = SBRω,εσ n(α, n).
We consider two cases.
Case 1. ω(α, n) < n.
Then α = SBRω,εσ n(α, n) = α, n, hence αn = 0, so α, n = α, n
′ and:
ω(α, n′) = ω(α, n) < n < n′.
Therefore,
SBRω,εσ n
′(α, n′) = α, n′ = α, n = α.
Case 2. ω(α, n) ≥ n.
Then:









. Thus αn = a, whence:
α = SBRω,εσ n
′(α, n′).
38 Interpretation of analysis: an extension of Dialectica with bar recursion
Lemma 3.6. Given ω : (0 → σ) → 0 and ε : 0 →
(
σ → (0 → σ)
)
→ σ, let
α := SBRω,εσ 0







Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that ω(α, n) < n. Then, using Lemma
3.5,
α = SBRω,εσ n(α, n) = α, n.
But then n = ω(α) = ω(α, n) < n, a contradiction. Hence ω(α, n) ≥ n. Now,
αn = SBRω,εσ n(α, n)n = SBR
ω,ε
σ n
′([α](n) ∗ a)n = a,






3.3 Interpretation of DNS
We are ready to give witnesses for the interpretation of DNS by means of bar
recursion. Recall that we only need solutions tx, tW , tV of the system of equations
(3.3), i.e., 
tx = Y (tW )
U(tx, tV ) = tW (Y (tW ))
tV (U(tx, tV )) = Z(tW ).
In order to make clearer the relation with the previous section, we rename vari-
ables as follows: tx 7→ n, Y 7→ ω, tW 7→ α, U 7→ ε, tV 7→ p and Z 7→ q. Therefore,





Theorem 3.7 (Spector, [43]). Given ω : (0 → σ) → 0, q : (0 → σ) → (0 → σ),
and ε : 0→
(
σ → (0→ σ)
)









where Em := λx
σ.SBRω,ε̃σ m
′([α](m) ∗ x), satisfy (3.6).
Proof. The first equation of (3.6) holds by definition. For the second one, notice
that by Lemma 3.6,
αn = ε̃nEn =: a,
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and using Lemma 3.5,
α = SBRω,ε̃σ n
′([α](n) ∗ a) = Ena.









= q(Ena) = qα.
Thus, we have achieved an extension of Dialectica (actually of ND) to analysis.
Theorem 3.8 (Spector, [43]). Let A(a) be a formula in the language of WE-HAω
containing only a free. If
WE-PAω + QF-AC + AC0 ` A(a),
then there is a tuple of closed terms t of WE-HAω + BR such that
WE-HAω + BR ` ∀y(AN)D(ta,y,a).
Moreover, t can be effectively extracted from a proof of the assumption.
Proof. The discussion in Section 3.1, together with Proposition 2.16, shows that
WE-PAω +QF-AC+AC0 is interpreted by N in WE-HAω +QF-AC+AC0 +MP+
DNS, and hence in WE-HAω + AC + MP + DNS. Hence, we only need to extend
the proof of soundness for Dialectica to DNS. This is done in Theorem 3.7.
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Chapter 4
Sequential games
In a series of recent papers [10–13], Mart́ın Escardó and Paulo Oliva presented
a new mathematical definition of game, whose primary purpose was to supply a
meaningful semantics to bar recursion, but which was so general that its wide
range and interest quickly became clear. This chapter is devoted to presenting this
theory of sequential games, and to give the reader a glimpse of the generality of
its semantics and applications. Chapter 5 explains its relation with bar recursion
and the interpretation of analysis by its means.
Sequential games, in our context, are meant to represent situations where
several choices must be made one after another. Let us suppose that the number
of choices is fixed as n ∈ N. We will have a set of possible moves (choices) Xi at
each round i < n, and a set R of possible outcomes of the game. A play will be
a sequence of elements x :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi, intended to mean the moves that have been
actually picked. The definition of game will also require an outcome function
p :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → R taking plays to its result. The number of players and the order
as they alternate is left implicit in functions φi : (Xi → R) → R for each round
i that say which is, at round i, the most desirable among the outcomes that are
possible given the conditions of the game. We note that φi takes as an argument
a function q : Xi → R, i.e., a function that can be considered a ‘local outcome
function’ for round i. The next sections will clarify how these functions behave.
For instance, assume that we want to express, through this definition of game,
a game between two players that alternate, where the possible outcomes are
R = {−1, 0, 1} and Player A plays at even rounds and aims for a 1, Player B
plays at odd rounds and aims for a −1, and 0 stands for a draw. Our way to
encode this is to have functions φi expressing, for even i, that the goal is to obtain
a 1 if possible, a 0 if not, while for odd i, φi expresses that the goal is to obtain a
−1 if possible, a 0 if not. More concretely, if we assume that we have a function
q : Xi → R assigning, to each possible move at round i, the outcome of the game
if that move is picked, then φi(q) is the best possible outcome for the current
player: e.g., if i is even, φi(p) = 1 if Player A has a winning strategy (i.e., can
obtain a 1 no matter how B plays), φi(p) = 0 if A has not a winning strategy but
can obtain a draw no matter how B plays, and φ(p) = −1 if there is no way for
A to avoid losing (assuming that B does the best he or she can do).
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Therefore, we think that our players always want to win, that they are in-
formed about the preferences of the other players, and that they always assume
that the other players will do the best they can.
Above, we have assumed that the number of rounds of the game is a fixed nat-
ural number n, but in Section 4.6 we will define a variant of games whose number
of rounds is not determined at the beginning, as it depends on the development
of the play.
This chapter is carried out in the framework of standard mathematics. Our
presentation combines content from [10–13].
4.1 Finite sequential games
Let us assume that we are given a sequence of non-empty sets 〈Xi : i < ω〉. We
understand each Xi as a set of possible moves at the ith round of a sequential
game.
Definition 4.1. Given a natural number n and non-empty sets X0, . . . , Xn−1, an
n-play is an element s ∈
∏n−1
i=0 Xi. A play is an n-play for some n ∈ N.
In the style of type theory, we shall write s :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi. When n = 0, the set∏n−1
i=0 Xi is interpreted as the set that only contains the empty sequence.
Defining a game also requires deciding what the outcomes of the possible
moves and the intentions of the players are. Thus, let us further suppose that we
are given a non-empty set R of possible outcomes of the game.
Definition 4.2. Given a natural number n and non-empty sets X0, . . . , Xn−1
and R, an outcome function for n-plays, or simply outcome function, is any
function p :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → R.
Thus, an outcome function is a function taking each play to its result. Now
we have to take care of the crucial step of defining what kind of functions will
express the intentions of the players in our games. The notion that captures this
will be that of generalized quantifier.
Definition 4.3. Given non-empty sets X and R, a generalized quantifier is a
function φ : (X → R)→ R. We abbreviate this type as:
KRX := (X → R)→ R.
When no confusion is possible, we will omit the subscript R, and thus write
simply KX.
Now we can give our definition of finite game.
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Definition 4.4. Let n be a natural number. An n-round game is a tuple(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, φ
)










is a finite sequence of quantifiers, one for each round.
Following the notation by Escardó and Oliva, we do not write the set R
explicitly in the tuple.
Below we give several examples in order to clarify the concept of finite game.
Example 4.5. Let us consider a game with a single round, set of possible moves
X and outcome function p : X → R, where R = {0, 1} and the goal of the player
is to get a 1. Then, the quantifier φ for the only round expresses the best outcome
that the player can obtain. That is, if there is a move x : X such that p(x) = 1,
then φ(p) = 1; otherwise, φ(p) = 0. Notice that, if we think of R as the boolean
values, where 0 stands for false and 1 stands for true, then p can be understood
as a predicate on X, and then:
φ(p) ≡ ∃xp(x).
That is where the name “quantifier” comes from.
Example 4.6. The usage of the word “generalized” is justified by the fact that
R can be different from the booleans. Let X = [0, 1] and R = R. Define for
p : [0, 1]→ R:
φ(p) :=
{
maxx∈[0,1] p(x) if the maximum exists
p(0) otherwise.
Then φ : KR[0, 1] is a generalized quantifier.
1




p if the integral exists
p(0) otherwise.
Then φ : KR[0, 1] is a generalized quantifier.
1 We could avoid the case distinction if we restrict ourselves to, for instance, p continuous, so
that Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem ensures the existence of the maximum. But if we want
to make this restriction formal, we would need some flexible definition of the type [0, 1] → R.
A category theoretical reading is suitable in this context. For details on this see [11].
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Example 4.8. In the informal example of a 2-player game at the beginning of
this chapter, we had R = {−1, 0, 1}. The goal of Player A is to maximize (with
respect the order −1 < 0 < 1) the outcome: to get a 1 if possible; if not, a 0;
and only if this is again not possible, a −1. Similarly, the goal of player B is
to minimize the outcome. Let us assume that there are only two rounds. Here,
our outcome function p is of type X × Y → R, where X := X0, Y := X1 are
the non-empty sets of possible moves for A and B respectively. What about the
quantifiers? Let us first analyse ψ, the quantifier of B. Player B aims for a
minimal outcome, and to B the move of A is given. So, if the move chosen by A
is x : X, then we have that B should aim for the outcome:
min{p(x, y) : y ∈ Y }.
Therefore, we can write ψ := minY , and then the best possible outcome for B
given the move x : X of A is:
ψ(px) = minY px = min{p(x, y) : y ∈ Y }.
On the other hand, A must maximize the outcome of the game, knowing that
B will take the move minimizing it. So the best possible outcome for A is:
max{min{p(x, y) : y ∈ Y } : x ∈ X}.
If we write φ := maxX for the generalized quantifier of A, then the outcome of









= max{min{p(x, y) : y ∈ Y } : x ∈ X}.
This motivates the definition of the product of quantifiers below, as a means for
obtaining this ‘best possible outcome of the game’ through a single quantifier of
type KR(X × Y ).
Definition 4.9. Let R,X, Y be non-empty sets. Given generalized quantifiers
φ : KRX and ψ : KRY , we define a quantifier (φ⊗ ψ) : KR(X × Y ) as:









Of course, we can iterate this construction any finite number of times, and we
obtain:
Definition 4.10. Let R,X0, . . . , Xn−1 be non-empty sets. Given quantifiers φi :
KRXi for i = 0, . . . , n− 1, we define recursively for each k < n− 1:
n−1⊗
i=k










i=0 φi = φ0 ⊗ . . . ⊗ φn−1, where we understand that ⊗ associates to
the right.
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4.2 Selection functions
Now we shall introduce the notion of selection function. We have seen that a
quantifier tells us what the outcome of the game is, assuming that the players
pick the best possible move for them at each round. We are interested in functions
of type ε : (X → R) → X, whose intended reading is that, given an outcome
function p : X → R, ε(p) will tell us which move is best, that is, p(εp) = φp.
This is not always possible, as we show in Example 4.14, but there are quan-
tifiers that admit an associated selection function. These quantifiers are called
attainable and, in fact, given any selection function, we can define the associated
attainable quantifier.
Definition 4.11. Let R and X be non-empty sets. A selection function is a
function of type ε : (X → R)→ X. We abbreviate this type as:
JRX := (X → R)→ X.
When no confusion is possible, as before, we will omit the subscript R, and thus
write simply JX.
If a quantifier is associated to a selection function, we call it attainable:
Definition 4.12. Let R and X be non-empty sets. A quantifier φ : KRX is
attainable if there is a selection function ε : JRX such that for all p : X → R,
p(εp) = φp.
Given a selection function ε : JRX, we define its associated (attainable)
quantifier ε as:
ε(p) := p(εp)
for every p : X → R.
Example 4.13. We recall Example 4.5, where R = {0, 1} is interpreted as the
boolean values and we define φ(p) ≡ ∃xp(x). Let us assume, for instance, that
X is finite and that in our context all p : X → R are computable. Let x0 : X be
some fixed element. We have a computable selection function defined as:
ε(p) :=
{
x for some x : X such that p(x) = 1
x0 if there is no such x.
Note that p(εp) = φ(p). This selection function says which move we should pick:
if there is an x : X such that p(x) = 1, then pick that x and win; if not, then
pick x0, since we will lose anyway. Thus, φ is an attainable quantifier.





where we define supx∈(0,1) p(x) = ∞ either if p(x) = ∞ for some x ∈ (0, 1) or if
the image of p is contained and unbounded in R. Then, φ is a non-attainable
generalized quantifier, since there are functions p such that φ(p) = ∞ but there




Example 4.15. I propose to my friends John and Michaela the following 2-round
game. Consider the arithmetical expression:
a2 + b+ 2ab.
The set of moves for both players is X = Y = {−1, 0, 1}. We understand that
when John chooses a move x ∈ X, he is setting a value for a, while Michaela sets
a value for b. This is reflected by our outcome function, which is defined, for all
(x, y) : X×Y , as p(x, y) = x2 +y+ 2xy. Notice that the set of possible outcomes
here is then:
R = {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 4}.
We conceive R as a linear order as expected with −2 < −1 < 0 < 1 < 2 < 4.
John’s goal is to maximize the outcome, while Michaela’s is to minimize it. If the
final outcome is positive, John wins, and if it is negative, Michaela does. A zero
outcome means a draw.
So John’s quantifier is φ = maxX , while Michaela’s is ψ = minY . But they
are not satisfied with a quantifier: they want a way of selecting their moves. It
is John’s turn and, since he is a careful player, he studies his possibilities. But,
even when it is not her turn yet, Michaela is already thinking about what she
will do. She thinks:
• If John gives a −1, then the expression simplifies as 1 + b− 2b = 1− b. So
Michaela shall work with the outcome function:
p−1(b) = 1− b.
In this case the minimum is:
ψ(p−1) = minY {1− b : b ∈ Y } = 0.
But that is not the only thing that Michaela wants to know. She wants to
know which b she should pick in order to attain this minimum. In this case,
this value of b is 1.
• If John gives a 0, then we get:
p0(b) = b.
In this case
ψ(p0) = minY {b : b ∈ Y } = −1
and it is realized by b = −1.
• Finally, if John gives a 1, then:
p1(b) = 1 + b+ 2b = 1 + 3b.
Then,
ψ(p1) = minY {1 + 3b : b ∈ Y } = −2
and it is realized by b = −1.
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So, even before John selects his move, Michaela knows how she is going to
reply. In case John takes x : X, Michaela takes:
δ(px) := the y ∈ Y such that px(y) is minimum.
(Of course this function is recursive, since all sets involved are finite.) In this
case, we have seen that δ(px) = b(x) given by:
b(x) :=
{
1 if x = −1
−1 if x = 0 or x = 1
Now, of course, John has also thought of all this. His quantifier (his goal)
suggests him that he should take the move that maximizes the minimum that
Michaela will try to get. He knows that if he takes x : X, Michaela will take
b(x) : Y . Hence, he knows that the outcome of the game will be p(x, b(x)). His
selection function, ε : JX, is defined by:
ε(qX→R) = the x ∈ X such that q(x) is maximal.






which gives the optimal outcome for him:
(φ⊗ ψ)(p) = maxX minY (p) = 0.
So, in this game, if we assume that the second player does the best she can do,
the first one can get at most a draw.
Now we define the product of selection functions, which will make us able to
select two moves at once.
Definition 4.16. Given selection functions ε : JRX and δ : JRY , we define a
selection function (ε⊗ δ) : JR(X × Y ) as:
(ε⊗ δ)(pX×Y→R) := 〈a, b(a)〉,
where:










As in the case of the quantifiers, we can iterate this construction.
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Definition 4.17. Given selection functions εi : JRXi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we
define recursively for each k < n− 1:
n−1⊗
i=k










i=0 εi = ε0⊗ . . .⊗ εn−1, where we understand again that ⊗ associates
to the right.
Our first theorem states that the attainable quantifier associated to the prod-
uct of two selection functions coincides with the product of the attainable quan-
tifiers associated to each one of them.
Theorem 4.18 ([11]). Let ε : JX and δ : JY . Then:
ε⊗ δ = ε⊗ δ.
Proof. Just unfolding the definitions, we get that both quantifiers encode the
optimal outcome p(a, b(a)).
ε⊗ δ(pX×Y→R) = p((ε⊗ δ)p) = p(a, b(a)),
(ε⊗ δ)(p) = ε(λx.δ(px)) = ε(λx.px(δpx)) = ε(λx.p(x, b(x))) = p(a, b(a)).
Using the above theorem and a straightforward induction, we obtain:
Theorem 4.19. Let ε :
∏n−1








This section is devoted to computing optimal strategies in our finite sequential
games. The definition of optimal outcome and move will rely on the product of
quantifiers, while the computation of explicit optimal strategies will be possible
using the product of selection functions.
First, we need some definitions. Let G =
(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, φ
)
be an n-round game.
4.3. Optimal strategies 49
(a) A partial play is a sequence a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi with k ≤ n. Given a partial play
a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi, we can define a subgame of G, which is an (n − k)-round
game, as: (





This game is like the original one but it starts at the position determined
by the partial play.








Given a partial play a :
∏k−1



























(c) Given a partial play a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi for k < n, an optimal move at round
k < n is a move ak such that wa = wa∗ak , that is, a move that does not
make worse the optimal outcome of the subgame.
(d) A play a = 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 is optimal if for each k < n, ak is an optimal
move with respect to the subgame determined by 〈a0, . . . , ak−1〉. Therefore,
the play a is optimal if and only if:
w〈〉 = w〈a0〉 = . . . = w〈a0,...,an−1〉.





for k < n, computing a move to be played at round k. That is, if the game
is at position a and we are following the above strategy, then the next move
selected is ak = nextk(a).
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(f) A strategy is optimal if for every k < n and every a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi, the move
nextk(a) is optimal at round k. More concisely, if wa = wa∗nextk(a). Given
an optimal strategy, we can define by induction an optimal play:
a0 := next0(〈〉), ak := nextk(〈a0, . . . , ak−1〉)
Remark 4.20. Our games as defined above cannot model the situation where
the set of allowed moves at round i depends on the moves played at previous
rounds. We will see a way of solving this problem in Section 4.5.
For the remainder of the section we assume that each quantifier φi in our
game is associated to a selection function εi.
Lemma 4.21 ([11]). Let
(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, φ
)
be an n-round game. For i = 0, . . . , n−1,
let us assume that φi is the associated quantifier of a selection function εi. For
each k < n, define a function nextk :
∏k−1




Then, the strategy 〈nextk〉n−1k=0 is an optimal strategy.
Proof. Fix k < n and a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi. We have to show that wa = wa∗nextk(a).
wa = φk(λxk.wa∗xk) = (λxk.wa∗xk)(εk(λxk.wa∗xk))
= wa∗εk(λxk.wa∗xk ) = wa∗nextk(a).
Theorem 4.22 ([11]). Let
(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, φ
)
be an n-round game. For i=0, . . . , n−1,
let us assume that φi is the associated quantifier of a selection function εi. The












Proof. Recall that for an n-play a we have that wa = p(a). So for k = n− 1 we
have that:
nextn−1(x) = εn−1(λxn−1.wx∗xn−1) = εn−1(λxn−1.p(x ∗ xn−1)) = εn−1(px),
which is equal to the right-hand side of (4.1) in case k = n− 1.



























Now, using Theorem 4.19,






























Corollary 4.23 ([11]). Let
(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, φ
)
be an n-round game. For i=0, . . . , n−1,









is optimal. In particular, p(a) = w.
4.4 Applications
In this section, we present several applications of sequential games to different
parts of mathematics. The aim is to illustrate the generality of the construction.
The examples have been extracted and adapted from [11,12].
4.4.1 Nash equilibrium




where Xi is the set of possible moves for player i, and pi :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → R is
the payoff function for player i. The set R comes with an order relation, and
greater values are understood as better payoffs. A play, also known as a strategy
profile, is an element x = 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 ∈
∏n−1
i=0 Xi. A Nash equilibrium is a
strategy profile such that no player can improve her payoff by changing her move
(assuming the other players keep their moves).
The product of selection functions can compute a Nash equilibrium. Our
game according to Definition 4.4 has n rounds and the set of possible moves at
round i is Xi. The set of possible outcomes is R
n, and the outcome function is
p :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → Rn defined as p(x) := 〈p0(x), . . . , pn−1(x)〉.
Assume we have selection functions ε0, . . . , εn−1 such that for every i:
εi(q
Xi→Rn) = xi : Xi such that q(xi)(i) = max
xi:Xi
{q(xi)(i)}. (4.2)
Then we can compute a Nash equilibrium for the game.
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of standard game theory,
let p :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi → Rn be defined as, for all x :
∏n−1
i=0 Xi,
p(x) := 〈p0(x), . . . , pn−1(x)〉.
Let us suppose that we have selection functions εi : JRnXi, for every i < n,
satisfying (4.2). Consider a game
(
〈Xi〉n−1i=0 , p, 〈εi〉n−1i=0
)








is a Nash equilibrium.
4.4.2 Fixed point theory
A fixed point operator is a map fix : (R→ R)→ R such that for every p : R→ R:
fix(p) = p(fix(p)).
These operators do not exist if we interpret R→ R as the set of all functions
from R to R, but they do exist in some categories of domains.
Since, in this case, JRR = KRR = (R → R) → R, a fixed point operator
can be considered both a quantifier and a selection function. Indeed, a function
f : (R → R) → R is a fixed point operator if and only if it is its own selection
function:
f(p) = p(f(p)).
Bekic̆’s Lemma [2] states that if X and Y have fixed point operators, then so
does X ×Y . We now prove this theorem constructing the fixed point operator of
the product as a product of selection functions.
Theorem 4.25 (Bekic̆’s Lemma). Let πX : X × Y → X and πY : X × Y → Y
denote the usual projections. Let fixX : JXX and fixY : JY Y be fixed point
operators. Define εX : JX×YX and εY : JX×Y Y as, for every p : X → X×Y and
q : Y → X × Y :
εX(p) := fixX(πX ◦ p), εY (q) := fixY (πY ◦ q).
Then, X × Y has a fixed point operator fixX×Y : JX×Y (X × Y ) defined by:
fixX×Y := εX ⊗ εY .
Proof. Given r : X×Y → X×Y , we need to show that fixX×Y (r) = r(fixX×Y (r)).
Let s : X × Y → X and t : X × Y → Y be the components of r, that is, for all
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , r(x, y) = 〈s(x, y), t(x, y)〉. Notice that:
fixX×Y (r) = (εX ⊗ εY )(r) = 〈a, b(a)〉,
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where:
b(x) = εY (rx) = fixY (tx),
a = εX(λx.r(x, b(x))) = fixX(λx.s(x, b(x))).
Then,
r(a, b(a)) = 〈s(a, b(a)), t(a, b(a))〉 = 〈a, b(a)〉,
using that fixX and fixY are fixed point operators.
4.4.3 Algorithmics: backtracking
Backtracking algorithms can be expressed via the product of selection functions.
Here we show the example of deciding the satisfiability of a propositional formula
in classical logic. For other examples on this, see [11].
Let A be a propositional formula with n variables, r = 〈r0, . . . , rn−1〉. Then
we can define a game with the goal of finding a model satisfying the formula. The
set of possible outcomes is R = {0, 1}, understood as the boolean values. We will
have n rounds, each one deciding the value of one variable. So the set of allowed
moves at round i is Xi = {0, 1}, with the intended reading that we are assigning
the chosen value to the variable ri. The outcome function:
pA : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
is defined, given x : {0, 1}n, as the evaluation of A under the interpretation where
each ri has value xi.
We interpret all functions f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} for m > 0 as propositional
formulas, and we say that f is satisfiable if there is x : {0, 1}m such that f(x) = 1.
For each round i, the quantifier φi : ({0, 1} → {0, 1})→ {0, 1} expresses that
the goal is to get a 1, so for each q : {0, 1} → {0, 1},
φi(q) := φ(q) :=
{
1 if q is satisfiable
0 otherwise.
This quantifier has associated selection function:
εi(q) := ε(q) :=
{
0 if q(0) = 1
1 otherwise.
(4.3)
Theorem 4.26 ([11]). Let
(
{0, 1}n, pA, 〈φi〉n−1i=0
)
be the game described above, and








is an assignment for r satisfying A.
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4.5 Dependent products
The allowed moves at each round of a game can depend on several factors, such
as the number of the current round or the development of each concrete play.
First of all, we observe that in the version of sequential games above the set
of possible moves depends just on the round, since for each round i we have a
different set of possible moves Xi. Our first observation is that this dependency
can be easily avoided. We can have just a set of possible moves of the game,
X, and encode which moves are forbidden at round i via the outcome function
p and the quantifier φi. For instance, if a move x : X is forbidden at round i,
and if r : R is a bad outcome for round i (in the sense that it is contrary to
the corresponding quantifier φi), then we define p in such a way that, if move
x is taken at round i, then the goal of round i is not attained: p(x) = r for
every x : Xn with x(i) = x. To do this, we need to have available more than
one possible outcome, so |R| > 1. If several forbidden moves are taken at the
same play, the outcome function must penalize the first one: once a player takes
a forbidden move, she loses. For further details see [11].
The remainder of this section is devoted to treating another important case:
when the intentions of the players, the way they alternate, or the possible moves
for round i depend not only on the number of the round but also on the current
state of the game, i.e., the moves taken at previous rounds. We encode this
dependency by means of a dependency of the quantifiers, that will result in a
dependency of the selection functions.
Here we reproduce previous definitions, taking now into account this new
dependency.
Definition 4.27. Let R and X0, . . . , Xn−1 be non-empty sets, and let i < n. A
dependent quantifier is any function φi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → KRXi.
We notice that, given a dependent quantifier φi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → KXi, we need a
partial play s :
∏i−1
j=0Xj in order to have an ordinary quantifier φi,s : KXi.
By an abuse of notation, we sometimes write φ0 : KX0 and φ1 : X0 → KX1,
instead of φ0 : {〈〉} → KX0 and φ1 :
∏0
j=0Xj → KX1.
Definition 4.28. Let R, X and Y be non-empty sets. Given dependent quanti-
fiers φ : KRX and ψ : X → KRY , we define a quantifier (φ⊗ ψ) : KR(X × Y ):









The iterated product generalizes as expected, although the notation is awk-
ward here.
Definition 4.29. Let R and X0, . . . , Xn−1 be non-empty sets. Given (dependent)
quantifiers φi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → KXi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we recursively define for
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i=0 φi = φ0 ⊗ . . . ⊗ φn−1, where we understand that ⊗ associates to
the right.
Selection functions have corresponding dependent versions as well.
Definition 4.30. Let R and X0, . . . , Xn−1 be non-empty sets, and let i < n. A
dependent selection function is any function εi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → JRXi.
Again, given a dependent selection function εi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → JXi, we need a
partial play s :
∏i−1
j=0Xj in order to have an ordinary selection function εi,s : JXi.
Definition 4.31. Let R, X and Y be non-empty sets. Given dependent selection
functions ε : JRX and δ : X → JRY , we define a selection function (ε ⊗ δ) :
JR(X × Y ) as:
(ε⊗ δ)(pX×Y→R) := 〈a, b(a)〉,
where:










As in the case of the quantifiers, we can iterate this construction.
Definition 4.32. Let R and X0, . . . , Xn−1 be non-empty sets. Given (dependent)
selection functions εi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → JXi for i = 0, . . . , n− 1, we recursively define



































i=0 εi = ε0⊗ . . .⊗ εn−1, where we understand again that ⊗ associates
to the right.
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Theorem 4.18 still holds for this version of the product, as a quick look at the
proof reveals.
The remaining sections of this chapter use dependent products to define un-
bounded games and the product of selection functions for them.
4.6 Unbounded games
As we previously announced, we are interested in games that have an unbounded,
although finite, number of rounds. This property will allow for the emulation of
bar recursion within our game-theoretic context.
Now we need to define plays as infinite sequences of moves:
Definition 4.33. Given non-empty sets Xi for each i ∈ N, an infinite play, or
simply a play, is an element α :
∏∞
i=0Xi.
Thus, the outcome function needs to work over infinite plays.
Definition 4.34. Given non-empty sets Xi for each i ∈ N, and a non-empty set
R, an outcome function is any function p :
∏∞
i=0Xi → R.
Again, Xi is the set of possible moves at round i. We will get rid of the
subscript i later on, when we need to use unbounded games inside a formal system
as WE-HAω, since there the product type is not defined. Thus, the infinite plays
will become of type 0→ X. For the moment, however, we assume that in each Xi
there is a canonical move 0i, and 0 means the sequence of the canonical elements
of appropriate type (for instance, 0 :
∏∞
i=nXi is the sequence 〈0i〉∞i=n). This is
done in order to have a canonical way of extending a finite play into an infinite
play.
Although the games we will consider in this section shall be unbounded, we
do require that they end. One way to ensure that plays end is imposing that
the relevant part of the play, that is, the initial segment of the play that is used
to determine the outcome of the game, is finite. Formally, this means that for
every sequence α :
∏∞
i=0Xi, there is an n such that p(α) = p([α](n) ∗ s) for every
s :
∏∞











→ p(α) = p(β)
)
. (4.4)
Of course this n now depends on the particular play, and so the number of rounds
of the game depends on how it develops.
An option is to impose that R is discrete (as a topological space) and p
is continuous, considering
∏∞
i=0Xi with the usual product topology. This is a
sufficient condition for (4.4). Details on this option can be found in [11].
However, we do not take condition (4.4). Another way to ensure that plays
end is having an explicit control, by what we mean a function ω :
∏∞
i=0Xi → N.
The idea is that, given a play α :
∏∞
i=0Xi, if n = ω(α) we consider that the
game is ended at round n, and so the relevant part of the play is [α](n). We
4.6. Unbounded games 57
notice that this does not guarantee that, given a play α, p(α) = p([α](n) ∗ 0),
nor that ω(α) = ω([α](n) ∗ 0). That is, in principle ω determines the relevant
part of the play based on the complete infinite play, and so the relevant part, and
the outcome, of α and [α](n) ∗ 0 (and of any other extension of [α](n)) may be
different. In some contexts, however, we can impose further conditions2. Anyway,
these conditions may be desirable but are not necessary. That the relevant part
of the play according to ω is not conclusive to determine the outcome of the
game may be an inconvenience (at least from a semantical viewpoint), but, as we
shall see, it is not an impediment to define the unbounded version of our games.
Therefore, our definition below does not include any conditions to ensure (4.4).
Definition 4.35. Given non-empty sets Xi for each i ∈ N, an explicit control,
or control function, is an object ω :
∏∞
i=0Xi → N.
That is the last ingredient for the definition of unbounded games.
Definition 4.36. Let R and Xi for each i ∈ N be non-empty sets. An un-
bounded game with explicit control, or unbounded game for short, is a
tuple
(





















is a control function.
Remark 4.37. Given an outcome function p :
∏∞
i=0Xi → R, a control function
ω :
∏∞







can define an unbounded game
(
〈Xi〉∞i=0, p, ε, ω
)
, where εks := εks. In some cases,
we will use the notation (p, ε, ω) to refer to this unbounded game.
Given an unbounded game G =
(
〈Xi〉∞i=0, p, φ, ω
)
, we define the following
versions of the finite-case concepts.
2If R is discrete and p is continuous, ω can be chosen as the implicit control function stated
above, that is, for each α, ω(α) is the least k such that p([α](k) ∗ s) = p(α) for every s :
∏∞
i=k.
This definition of ω uses the axiom of choice.
Also, in contexts where the functionals allowed are computable in some sense, usually p(α)
uses only a finite part of α to compute the result, and so (4.4) holds and an ω can be defined
as before.
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(a) A partial play is a sequence a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi with k ∈ N. Given a partial
play a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi, we can define a subgame of G, which will be still an
unbounded game, as: (
〈Xi〉∞i=k, pa, 〈φi〉∞i=k, ωa
)
.
This game is like the original one but it starts at the position determined
by the partial play.





for k ∈ N, computing a move to be played at round k. That is, if the
game is at position a and we are following the above strategy, then the
next move selected is ak = nextk(a). The strategy inductively defines a
strategic extension of a as:
βa(j) := nextj(a0, . . . , ak−1, β
a(k), . . . , βa(j − 1))
for j ≥ k. That is, a∗βa is the play starting with a and completed following
the strategy next.
(c) A strategy is optimal if for every partial play a :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi such that
k ≤ ω(a ∗ βa) we have:
p(a ∗ βa) = φk,a(λxk.p(a ∗ xk ∗ βa∗xk)).
4.7 Explicitly controlled product
The goal of this section is to define a product of selection functions that takes into
account the fact that the game is unbounded. This product is defined by means
of a functional named EPS, the acronym used in the literature after “explicitly
controlled product of selection functions”. As the following chapter discusses,
this instance of the product is powerful enough to replace bar recursion on the
task of interpreting analysis.
As in the case of bar recursion, EPS will be well-defined if we are in a setting
of computable functionals, where the control function ω only sees a finite part
of the sequence that takes as an argument. A condition like (3.4), which in the







ω(s, n) < n
)
,
is sufficient. For the complete discussion see Section 3.2. From now on we assume
that we are in a setting where all functionals are computable. This will be more
precise when we study EPS as a principle for the formal system WE-HAω.
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Definition 4.38. Given non-empty sets R and Xi for each i ∈ N, we define, for





























i=kXi→R.0 if ω(s ∗ 0) < k
εk,s ⊗ λxXk .EPSk+1(s ∗ x)ωε otherwise,
where s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi is a partial play, ω :
∏∞







is a sequence of (dependent) selection functions.
We use the name EPS to refer to the functional λk.EPSk. The following lemma
states how EPS behaves when applied to an outcome function.
Lemma 4.39 ([10, 13]). Let R and Xi for i ∈ N be non-empty sets, let ω :∏∞







of selection functions. Given k ∈ N, for every partial play s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi and every
outcome function p :
∏∞
i=kXi → R, we have that:
EPSksωεp =
{
0 if ω(s ∗ 0) < k
a ∗ EPSk+1(s ∗ a)ωεpa otherwise,
where a := εk,s
(
λxXk .px(EPSk+1(s ∗ x)ωεpx)
)
.
Proof. Just unfolding the definitions. To compute EPSksωεp, we first check if
ω(s ∗ 0) < k. If that is true, then we get (λp.0)(p) = 0. If not, then we get:
EPSksωεp =
(
εk,s ⊗ λxXk .EPSk+1(s ∗ x)ωε
)
(p) = a ∗ b(a),







λxXk .px(EPSk+1(s ∗ x)εωpx)
)
,
and so we are done.
The intuition is that EPS0〈〉ωε is the iteration
⊗∞
i=0 εi, and actually in the
literature the latter is sometimes the notation used. However, we preserve here
the heavy notation to keep in mind that EPS strongly depends on its control.
Remark 4.40. We notice that if ω is the constant function λs.n, then we get
the finite product, in the sense that EPS0〈〉ωεp = (
⊗n
i=0 εi) (p
′) ∗ 0, where p′ is
defined, for s :
∏n
i=0Xi, by p
′(s) := p(s ∗ 0). See [14].
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Lemma 4.41 ([10, 13]). Let R and Xi for i ∈ N be non-empty sets, let ω :∏∞







of selection functions. Given k ∈ N, a partial play s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi and an outcome
function p :
∏∞
i=kXi → R, consider α = EPSksωεp. For all j ∈ N,





Proof. By induction on j. The case j = 0 is just the definition of α. Now assume
it holds for j ≥ 0, and let us prove it for j + 1. There are two cases:






So, using the IH,




ωεp[α](j) = [α](j) ∗ 0 = [α](j + 1) ∗ 0.
Hence, ω(s ∗ [α](j+ 1) ∗ 0) = ω(s ∗ [α](j) ∗ 0) < k+ j < k+ j+ 1, so:
EPSk+j+1
(




α = [α](j + 1) ∗ 0 = [α](j + 1) ∗ EPSk+j+1
(
s ∗ [α](j + 1)
)
ωεp[α](j+1).
Case 2. ω(s ∗ [α](j) ∗ 0) ≥ k + j. By the IH,





= [α](j) ∗ a ∗ EPSk+j+1
(
s ∗ [α](j) ∗ a
)
ωεp[α](j)∗a.
But then α(j) = a, and so the expression above translates to
α = [α](j + 1) ∗ EPSk+j+1
(
s ∗ [α](j + 1)
)
ωεp[α](j+1).
We state the following corollary for future convenience:
Corollary 4.42. Let R and Xi for i ∈ N be non-empty sets, let ω :
∏∞
i=0Xi → N






a sequence of selection
functions. Given an outcome function p :
∏∞
i=0Xi → R, consider α = EPS0〈〉ωεp.
For all j ∈ N, we have:





We define the associated quantifier to a selection function in this setting.
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Definition 4.43. Given a dependent selection function εi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → JRXi,
we define its associated (attainable) dependent quantifier εi :
∏i−1
j=0Xj → KRXi




Now we can compute optimal strategies for unbounded games.
Theorem 4.44 ([12]). Let
(
〈Xi〉∞i=0, p, φ, ω
)
be an unbounded game with explicit
control, and for each i ∈ N let us assume that φi is the associated quantifier of a









Proof. Note that, by Lemma 4.41, βx = EPSkxωεpx. Assume ω(x ∗ βx) ≥ k.
Then, we also have that ω(x ∗ 0) ≥ k, since otherwise, by the definition of the
strategy, we would have:
EPSkxωεpx = 0 = β
x,
and that is a contradiction with the assumption.
Now, by definition, we have:
βx(k) = nextk(x) = εk,x
(





Xk .px(x ∗ βx∗x)).
Let q = λxXk .px(x ∗ βx∗x). Then:
φk,x(q) = q(εk,xq),
and note that:








q(βx(k)) = q(εk,xq) = φk,x(q).
Since again q(βx(k)) = px(β
x(k) ∗ βx,βx(k)) = px(βx), we are done.
Notation 4.45. Notice that the notation φk,s and εk,s above is redundant, since
we have k = |s|, and therefore we sometimes write simply φs and εs.
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Chapter 5
Interpretation of analysis: an
extension of Dialectica with EPS
This chapter is devoted to showing how the product of selection functions with ex-
plicit control is capable of interpreting analysis, playing the role of bar recursion.
The outline is as follows.
In Section 5.1 we present the main theorem on EPS that will allow for witness-
ing the interpretation. Picking up the discussion from Chapter 3, a well-suited
system for the formalization of classical analysis is WE-PAω + QF-AC + CA0,
whose ND-interpretation reduces, as Propositions 2.16, 3.1, and 3.2 show, to the
D-interpretation of WE-HAω + AC + MP + DNS. We witness this interpretation
via EPS in Section 5.2.
Section 5.3 is devoted to showing the equivalence between EPS and bar recur-
sion, and Section 5.4 explains the advantages of the former over the latter.
This chapter combines results by Escardó and Oliva [10–13] with our setting
for the interpretation of analysis of Chapter 3, which recall that follows [26,
Chapter 11].
5.1 Main theorem on EPS
In this section we prove the most general version of the main theorem about
EPS, that will allow for interpreting several non-constructive steps in the proof
of Ramsey’s theorem in Chapter 6.
Since our presentation of sequential games occurs in a framework of standard
mathematics and uses, for instance, Cartesian products, we also give here an
adapted version for a system in all finite types as WE-HAω.
The next theorem uses Notation 4.45.
64 Interpretation of analysis: an extension of Dialectica with EPS
Theorem 5.1 ([10]). Let
(
〈Xi〉∞i=0, q, φ, ω
)
be an unbounded game with attainable






be such that for every k ∈ N
and s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi, φs = εs. For every partial play s :
∏k−1
i=0 Xi and x : Xk, define:
α := EPS0〈〉ωεq,
ps(x) := EPSk+1(s ∗ x)ωε(qs∗x).
Then, for all n ≤ ω(α) we have:
αn = ε[α](n)(p[α](n)),
qα = ε[α](n)(p[α](n)).
Proof. Assume that n ≤ ω(α). Then, we also have
n ≤ ω([α](n) ∗ 0), (5.1)
since n > ω([α](n) ∗ 0) together with Corollary 4.42 would imply α = [α](n) ∗ 0,
and hence:
n > ω([α](n) ∗ 0) = ω(α) ≥ n,












































The above theorem, together with Theorem 4.44, says that we can compute
an optimal play α, and that moreover there are outcome functions ‘local’ for each
round of the relevant part of the optimal play, in the following sense. For each
n ≤ ω(α), we have a local outcome function p[α](n) : Xn → R such that the global
outcome of the game is equal to the outcome predicted by the local function and
the selection function of round n, i.e., qα = p[α](n)(ε[α](n)p[α](n)).
Now we rephrase this theorem for adequate types. All sets of possible moves
will be one and the same type, σ. Therefore, the type
∏∞
i=0Xi becomes 0→ σ, or
σ0 for short. The type of the outcomes, R, is now written τ . Moreover, we make
informal use of the type of finite sequences over σ, which is named σ∗. This type
can be coded easily by the type σ0. In some cases, however, we need a refinement
of this encoding, since an increase of the complexity of the type is not desirable:
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Remark 5.2. By σ∗ we refer to the type of finite sequences over σ, encoded in
any other type of our formal system (for instance, in σ0). However, in the case of
finite sequences over the natural numbers, 0∗, we assume that our encoding is done
in type 0 itself. It is well-known that there are primitive recursive encodings of
0∗ in 0, for instance, Gödel’s encoding. We will also use this fact for finite binary
sequences in the next chapter. More details on these encodings can be found
in [44], [34].
Theorem 5.3. Let q : σ0 → τ , ω : σ0 → 0, and let ε : σ∗ → Jτσ. For every
s : σ∗ and x : σ, define:
α :=σ0 EPS0〈〉ωεq,
ps(x) :=τ EPS|s|+1(s ∗ x)ωε(qs∗x).
Then, for all n ≤ ω(α) we have:
αn =σ ε[α](n)(p[α](n)),
qα =τ ε[α](n)(p[α](n)).
Remark 5.4. Sometimes, ε does not depend on the finite sequence but only
on its length, as in our first presentation of the product. So its type can be
ε : 0→ Jτσ, and then we interpret the occurrences of εs in the definition of EPS
simply as ε|s|. Thus, we avoid defining each time selection functions εs as for all
s, εs := ε|s|. This can be understood as a notational matter.
5.2 Interpretation of DNS
In order to witness the interpretation of DNS, recall that Proposition 3.3 tells




tx = Y (tW )
U(tx, tV ) = tW (Y (tW ))
tV (U(tx, tV )) = Z(tW ).






where recall that, for the case of DNS, τ is σ0.
Remark 5.5. There is a similarity between the results about bar recursion SBR
obtained in Chapter 3 and the current results about EPS. Lemma 3.5 corresponds
to Corollary 4.42; Theorem 3.7 corresponds to Theorem 5.6; and of course The-
orem 3.8 corresponds to Theorem 5.8.
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We now use EPS to give a solution to this system.
Theorem 5.6. For all types σ, τ ∈ T and all ω : σ0 → 0, ε : 0 → (σ → τ) → σ












We have that α, n and p satisfy (3.6).
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 5.3 (and Remark 5.4).
Thus we can extend Dialectica to analysis via EPS. For the extension, it
is sufficient with the simplest of our definitions of EPS. The principle and the
functional are both called EPS in the literature, and we follow this practice.
Definition 5.7. For all types σ, τ , let us consider a constant symbol EPSσ,τ . We
define the principle EPS as the schema of defining equations, for variables s : σ∗,
ω : σ0 → 0, ε : 0→ (σ → τ)→ σ, and p : σ0 → τ ,
EPSσ,τ|s| sωεp =σ0
{
0 if ω(s ∗ 0) < |s|
a ∗ EPSσ,τ|s|+1(s ∗ a)ωεpa otherwise,







System WE-HAω+EPS is an extension of WE-HAω with new constant symbols
EPSσ,τ for all types σ, τ , and the axiom schema EPS.
Theorem 5.8. Let A(a) be a formula in the language of WE-HAω containing
only a free. If
WE-PAω + QF-AC + AC0 ` A(a),
then there is a tuple of closed terms t of WE-HAω + EPS such that
WE-HAω + EPS ` ∀y(AN)D(ta,y,a).
Moreover, t can be effectively extracted from a proof of the assumption.
5.3 Equivalence to SBR
The special form of bar recursion SBR turns out to be equivalent to EPS, meaning
that we can define each from the other one in a primitive recursive way. Actually,
SBR is equivalent to the general form of bar recursion BR, and hence so is EPS.
For details see [40] or [13].
However, proving that the definition of EPS using SBR is correct requires a
principle called bar induction. Since this topic lies outside our purposes, and we
only intend to give here intuition on how these principles are equivalent, we avoid
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this technical question by presenting a variant of EPS, called here ẼPS, for which
the equivalence to SBR is provable over WE-HAω. This variant is actually the
one used in [40].
For the most general results about equivalence of forms of bar recursion and
the product of selection functions the reader is referred to [13].
Remark 5.9. The symbol @ stands for a binary function on sequences overwrit-
ing the first part of the second sequence, so that for s : σ∗ and α : σ0,
(s@α)(k) :=
{
s(k) if k < |s|
α(k) otherwise.
Consider the following definitions. For all n : 0, s : σ0, ω : σ0 → 0, ε : 0 →
(σ → σ0)→ σ,
SBRσnsωε := [s](n)@
{
s, n if ω(s, n) < n
SBRσ(Sn)([s](n) ∗ a)ωε otherwise,




. Notice that overwriting the first
part with [s](n) is harmless here, since, as seen in Chapter 3, [s](n) is always the
initial segment of SBRσnsωε. We write it to avoid some technical details below.
On the other hand, for all n : 0, s : σ∗ of length n, ω : σ0 → 0, p : σ0 → τ and
ε : 0→ (σ → τ)→ σ,
ẼPSnsωεp := s@
{
0 if ω(s ∗ 0) < n
ẼPSn+1(s ∗ a)ωεp otherwise,




. It is intuitively clear that ẼPS is
equivalent to EPS (when the family of selection functions does not depend on the
sequence, as in Section 5.2). The idea is that ẼPS computes the whole sequence
while EPS forgets the first part, in the sense that ẼPSnsωεp = s ∗ EPSnsωεps.
The proof, as stated above, requires bar induction, and can be found in [13].
Theorem 5.10 ([40]). SBR and ẼPS as defined in Remark 5.9 are equivalent over
WE-HAω, in the sense that there is a term t of WE-HAω such that the defining
equations of SBR are satisfied by t(ẼPS) provably in WE-HAω, and viceversa.
Proof. Let us define SBR from ẼPS. We use ẼPS with τ = σ0. Define p : σ0 → σ0












ωεp = [s](n)@0 = s, n.
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Conversely, given n : 0, s : σ∗ of length n, ω : σ0 → 0, p : σ0 → τ , and








Let us prove that this satisfies the definition of ẼPS above. If ω(s ∗ 0) < n, then
ẼPSnsωεp = SBRσnsωε̃ = s@0,
as required. If ω(s ∗ 0) ≥ n, then



















and hence ẼPS defined like this satisfies the definition in Remark 5.9.
5.4 Advantages of EPS over bar recursion
Recall that the D-interpretation of DNS led to:
∃U ∀x, V ¬¬AD
(





Y (WY Z),WY Z(Y (WY Z)), Z(WY Z)
)
.
After renaming and removing double negations in front of quantifier-free for-
mulas, we have:
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That is, DNSD can be viewed as stating that if we have selection functions that
witness AD at each round and for any outcome function, then there is a functional
α that, for every control and outcome function ω, q, gives a global play αω,q
witnessing AD. We have seen that α is precisely the explicitly controlled product
of the functions ε.
So, basically, the interpretation of DNS asks exactly for what the main theorem
on EPS gives.
We have seen that appropriate instances of EPS and SBR are equivalent over
WE-HAω. All of them are capable of interpreting analysis, and in this sense
there is no better option. If the aim is to give a relative consistency proof, all are
equally convenient as well.
But when choosing among them for proof mining, it might be the case, and
it actually is, that one of them has advantages over the other. The rest of this
section is devoted to explaining the two main advantages of EPS over bar recursion
regarding proof mining.
The first of them has to do with the fact that the algorithm of term extraction
that the proof of soundness of the ND-interpretation gives is unpractical, due to
several reasons. On the one hand, classical proofs of theorems in analysis are
usually written in high-level, and a strict formalization of one of these proofs in
our system WE-PAω + QF-AC + CA0 would involve a huge amount of steps. On
the other hand, even if we had such a formalization, the algorithm would yield a
huge term, which probably only a computer might obtain.
Therefore, what is usually done in proof mining is a compromise between a
high-level proof and a strict formalization. The classical proof is worked out up
to a certain, greater than usual, level of detail, and then the interpretation is
applied piecewise to some parts of the proof. Finding witnesses and filling the
gaps generally requires not only the use of whatever principle we have accepted,
EPS or SBR, but also intuition and mathematical thinking, both constructive and
classical. Chapter 6 is an extensive example thereof.
If term extraction were just an algorithmic procedure, the choice between
EPS and SBR would be completely irrelevant. But, as we have discussed, it is
not. The benefit of EPS is that it supplies a clear semantics, and this enables
the mathematician to turn his or her effort from a syntactical matter into a
semantical one, thus facilitating the task of interpreting theorems and proofs,
and presumably leading to a faster growth of the proof mining program.
Yet there is another advantage, maybe more important. Since its birth until
now, proof mining has been synonymous with term extraction. As discussed in the
introduction, it has allowed for extracting explicit bounds from non-constructive
proofs in analysis. However, there is another task that proof mining can accom-
plish: to understand the constructive content of classical proofs in daily math-
ematics. The game-theoretic semantics gives the intuition of theorems as state-
ments about games and their proofs as the search for an optimal strategy in the
corresponding game. As we will show in Chapter 6, this conceptual reading of
the Dialectica interpretation is enlightening.
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Chapter 6
A constructive interpretation of
Ramsey’s Theorem
The Infinite Ramsey Theorem, also referred to here simply as Ramsey’s theorem,
has been widely studied in logic, and in particular there are several papers [3, 6,
7, 27, 48] studying its constructive content. To this end, the proof by Erdős and
Rado [9] is more convenient than the original proof by Ramsey [41], since the
latter, although apparently simpler, uses further non-constructive principles.
Recently, Oliva and Powell [38] presented a constructive interpretation of
Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and two colours, based on the Dialectica interpre-
tation, and a constructive proof using the product of selection functions. Their
paper is inspired by [27], which presents a similar interpretation of Ramsey’s the-
orem realized, however, using bar recursion instead of selection functions. In this
chapter we expose the results of [38] with a deeper level of detail, and we extend
all of them for the case of r ≥ 2 colours.
Recall that Ramsey’s theorem states the existence of a monochromatic infinite
subset H ⊆ N for any colouring with r colours of subsets of size k of the natural
numbers. If we write [X]k for the set of subsets of X of exactly k elements, and
[r] for the set {0, . . . , r − 1}1, we can state the theorem a bit more formally as:
Theorem 6.1 (Ramsey’s theorem). For every c : [N]k → [r], there exists a colour
x ∈ [r] and an infinite subset H ⊆ N such that for every A ∈ [H]k, c(A) = x.
However, this version is still too informal for our purposes. When we apply the
Dialectica interpretation, in principle we should do it with strict logical syntax
and follow the proof of soundness to extract a precise term realizing the theorem.
But, in practice, this procedure is unfeasible to carry out by hand. Hence, our
syntax is a compromise between formality and readability.
In general terms, the only violations to the syntax of WE-HAω will be the
use of the type [r] and B := [2] (the booleans), the type B∗ of finite sequences
over B, and bounded quantifiers, which are understood as usual. All of these are
just abbreviations: a term t : [r] can be formally encoded by a term t : 0 such
that t < r; as for a term s : B∗, it can be coded by s : 0 by means of a primitive
1We do not write simply r, as usual in set theory, to distinguish [r] from the pure type r.
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recursive encoding similar to Gödel’s well-known encoding for finite sequences of
natural numbers (see Remark 5.2).
Throughout this chapter, we relax our notation to improve readability. We
write N instead of 0, we abbreviate the type σ → τ as τσ and the type σ → σ → τ
as σ2 → τ . The variables i, j, k, n,m are always assumed to be of type N.
In systems in all finite types, as WE-HAω, it is not possible to directly express
the existence of an infinite subset of the natural numbers satisfying some condi-
tion. Instead, we state the existence of a function f : N → N with unbounded
image (imposing, for instance, that for all n, fn ≥ n) such that the image satisfies
the required condition. That is, instead of subsets of N we use (not necessarily
injective) enumerations of subsets of N. This will be common practice in what
follows.
6.1 Preliminary definitions and theorems
This section is devoted to presenting some usual definitions and well-known theo-
rems that are needed throughout the chapter. Our definitions are stated in order
to be well-suited for our proof of Ramsey’s theorem: no attempt is made to give
the most general definitions and results.
There is an easy particular case of Ramsey’s theorem, when k = 1. This case
is called infinite pigeon-hole principle. We state it here for clarity:
Theorem 6.2 (Infinite pigeon-hole principle). For every colouring c : N → [r],
there exists a colour x ∈ [r] and an infinite subset H ⊆ N such that for every
n ∈ H, c(n) = x.
Our proof will make use of trees, for which there are several definitions in
mathematics. We present here two of them.
Definition 6.3. A partial order≺ on N describes a tree if it has a unique minimal
element and for every i ∈ N, the set of its predecessors pd(i) = {k ∈ N : k ≺ i}
is well-ordered by ≺. A branch is a maximal chain of the tree. Moreover,
the tree is finitely branching if every i ∈ N has at most a finite number of
immediate successors. It is n-ary branching if every i ∈ N has at most n
different immediate successors.
We also use a description of trees by means of a predicate over finite sequences,
that tells us whether a given sequence is an initial segment of a branch of the tree
or not.
Definition 6.4. Given a type σ, a predicate T over σ∗ (in the language of
WE-HAω) is a tree predicate if T is prefix closed, i.e., for every s : σ∗, if T (s)
holds, then T ([s](m)) holds for every m < |s|. If σ = B, then T is a binary tree.
If for every s : σ∗, WE-HAω proves T (s)∨¬T (s), then T is said to be decidable.
For a tree predicate T over σ∗, if s : σ∗ and we have T (s), then we say that s
is a branch of T .
Now we state König’s lemma, a well-known result from set theory that is not
provable in Peano arithmetic.
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Theorem 6.5 (König’s lemma). A finitely branching tree ≺ on N has an infinite
branch.
Since our aim is to give a constructive realizer for Ramsey’s theorem for pairs,
we will avoid König’s lemma, taking a detour and using weak König’s lemma
instead. In our setting, the most convenient way to state weak König’s lemma is
as follows:
Theorem 6.6 (Weak König’s lemma). Let T be a tree predicate over B∗. If T is
decidable, then T has an infinite branch, i.e., there is a sequence α : N→ B such
that T ([α](n)) holds for every n ∈ N.
6.2 A formal (classical) proof
First of all we need to formalize the statements that will be used throughout the
proof. We present a rough sketch of the classical proof, and from that point we
analyse which principles it will require.
The idea behind the proof is as follows. Given a colouring c, we arrange the
natural numbers on a tree, described by an order ≺ to be defined below. This
tree is called Erdős-Rado tree, or E-R tree for short. It is finitely branching, or
more concretely, each node has at most r different immediate successors. The key
property of the E-R tree is that for any i, j, k ∈ N, if i ≺ j ≺ k, then c({i, j}) =
c({i, k}). By König’s lemma, this tree has an infinite branch. Suppose that
b : N→ N is an injective ≺-increasing enumeration of the infinite branch, that is,
for each i ∈ N, b(i) is the ith node of the branch under the order ≺. Now we define
a colouring c′ : N→ [r] as c′(i) = c(b(i), b(i+ 1)), and by the infinite pigeon-hole
principle there is an infinite monochromatic subset H of N with respect to c′.
But then the set Hb := {b(i) : i ∈ H} is pairwise monochromatic under c.
For simplicity, the type of a colouring of pairs of natural numbers will be
N2 → [r] (or, equivalently, 0 → 0 → [r]), instead of [N]2 → [r]. Of course, we
need to impose the condition c(i, j) = c(j, i) for every i, j ∈ N. Note that there
is a canonical way of assigning a colouring to every c : N2 → [r], namely:
č(i, j) :=
{
c(i, j) if i < j
c(j, i) otherwise.
Therefore, each time we quantify over colourings, we can think, if we wish,
that we quantify over c : N2 → [r] and then we use č everywhere.
We notice that the principles that we use amount to König’s lemma and
the infinite pigeon-hole principle. In our formalization, we avoid the use of full
König’s lemma by encoding the E-R tree by a binary decidable tree, and then
using weak König’s lemma on it.
Our first encoding below of the E-R tree by a binary tree is Σ01, and in order
to make it decidable we will need a weak form of choice, more precisely Π01-
countable choice. Therefore, the principles that we need are the infinite pigeon-
hole principle, IPHP; weak König’s lemma, WKL; and countable choice for Π01-
formulas, Π01-AC
0.
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The infinite pigeon-hole principle is a single axiom stating, as we have seen,
that for every colouring of the natural numbers with r colours, there is an infinite
monochromatic subset H.
IPHP : ∀cN→[r]∃x[r], pN→N∀k
(
pk ≥ k ∧ c(pk) = x
)
.
Here the infinite subset is encoded by a function p that enumerates it, that is,
H = {pk : k ∈ N}.
Our instance of choice is an axiom schema that reads:
Π01-AC
0 : ∀n∃xσ∀mA0(n, x,m)→ ∃α0→σ∀n,mA0(n, αn,m),
where A0 is quantifier-free.
Weak König’s lemma is an axiom schema stating the existence of an infinite
branch in every externally given infinite decidable binary tree T :
WKL(T ) : ∀n∃sB∗
(
|s| = n ∧ T (s)
)
→ ∃αN→B∀nT ([α](n)).
Finally, we formalize Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and r colours as:
RT2r(c) : ∃x[r], FN→N∀k
(
Fk ≥ k ∧ ∀i, j ≤ k(Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x)
)
,
where c : N2 → [r] is a colouring. Here the infinite set is encoded by F as before.
Notice that instead of Fi < Fj we could have required simply Fi 6= Fj.
Now we are ready to start the proof. We will use the following convention:
we call Propositions or Theorems, depending on their relevance, those statements
that will be interpreted in subsequent sections, and we call Lemmas the technical
results needed for Propositions and Theorems, which are not directly translated
from the classical proof into the interpretation.
The first thing we need is the definition of the E-R tree.
Definition 6.7 (Erdős-Rado tree). Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring. We define a
partial order ≺ on N recursively as follows:
(i) 0 has no predecessors.
(ii) 0 ≺ 1, and moreover 0 is the only predecessor of 1.
(iii) If the predecessors of every j ∈ [k] are already defined, we proceed to define
the predecessors of k. For every j < k, define:
j ≺ k iff c(i, k) = c(i, j) for all i ≺ j.
Example 6.8. Consider the colouring:
c(i, j) :=
{
0 if i ≡ j mod 3
1 otherwise.
This generates the E-R tree of Figure 6.1. The edge labels are there for clarity:
the edge from i to j is labelled as c(i, j). We shall see that ≺ defines a transitive
relation and the figure should be understood as such.
The next lemma states properties of the E-R tree that will be needed later.


















Figure 6.1: Tree obtained in Example 6.8
Lemma 6.9 ([27]). Given a colouring c : N2 → [r], let ≺ be the relation of
Definition 6.7. The following hold:
(i) The relation ≺ is a strict partial order and, moreover, ≺⊆<, where < is
the usual order on N.
(ii) For every k ∈ N, on the set pd(k) of its predecessors the orders ≺ and <
coincide. That is, if i ≺ k and j ≺ k, then i ≺ j iff i < j.
(iii) The order ≺ defines an r-ary branching tree on N.
(iv) The branches of the E-R tree are min-monochromatic: if i ≺ j ≺ k, then
c(i, j) = c(i, k).
Proof. For (i), first note that ≺⊆< follows directly from the definition, as well
as the irreflexivity of ≺. To prove transitivity, we proceed by complete induction
on k to prove that if i ≺ j and j ≺ k, then i ≺ k.
If k = 0, it has no predecessors and so the implication follows. Now assume
k > 0 and that transitivity holds for all k′ < k. Suppose we have i ≺ j and
j ≺ k. By definition, i ≺ k iff for all i′ ≺ i, c(i′, i) = c(i′, k). Fix i′ ≺ i to see that
c(i′, i) = c(i′, k). Since i ≺ j, c(i′, i) = c(i′, j). Also, j < k, so by IH we have that
i′ ≺ j. Since j ≺ k, we have that c(i′, k) = c(i′, j), and this ends the proof.
For (ii), we proceed by induction on k. If k = 0 the claim is obvious. Assume
that the claim is proved for every k′ < k. Let i, j ≺ k. Since ≺⊆<, we only
need to prove that i < j implies i ≺ j. So assume i < j. Of course 0 ≺ i, 0 ≺ j.
Let l be the <-greatest such that l ≺ i, l ≺ j. Among the immediate successors
of l, there is at least one that is ≺ k, since l ≺ i ≺ k. Among those, take m the
<-minimal. Note that, since l ≺ m ≺ k, l ≺ i ≺ k and l ≺ j ≺ k, we have that
c(l, k) = c(l,m) = c(l, i) = c(l, j). (6.1)
We have that m 6= j. Indeed, since l ≺ i, j and is maximal with this property,
m 6≺ i or m 6≺ j. But since m is minimal being an immediate succesor of l such
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that m ≺ k, then m ≤ i < j, and so m < j. Now, we show that m ≺ j. Let
i′ ≺ m. By the IH applied to m, either i′ ≺ l or i′ = l (the case l ≺ i′ is impossible
because m is an immediate successor of l). If i′ ≺ l ≺ m, then, since i′ ≺ l ≺ j,
c(i′,m) = c(i′, l) = c(i′, j),
as required, and if i′ = l, by (6.1) we have c(l,m) = c(l, j). Therefore, m ≺ j.
But now, if we assume i 6= m, the same argument works for showing m ≺ i,
and this is impossible by the maximality of l and the fact that m ≺ j. Therefore,
i = m and so i ≺ j. This ends the proof of (ii).
Now, to obtain (iii), observe that, since the set of predecessors of a node is
ordered by <, it is well-ordered. Hence, ≺ is a tree order. Moreover, it is r-ary
branching because if i, j are different immediate successors of k, then from the
definition of ≺ follows that c(i, k) 6= c(j, k).
Finally, (iv) follows from the definition of j ≺ k.
Now that we have the definition and key properties of the E-R tree, the next
step is to define a binary tree predicate that encodes its branches. The follow-
ing definition presents a Σ01-predicate T which will be turned into a decidable
predicate by means of our limited principle of choice, Π01-AC
0.
Definition 6.10. Given a colouring c : N2 → [r] and the corresponding E-R tree
described by ≺, define for s : B∗ and k : N:
T ′(s, k) := ∃k′ ∈ [|s|, k] ∀i < |s|(si = 0↔ i ≺ k′),
and:
T (s) := ∃kT ′(s, k).
Note that T ′(s, k) can be written as a quantifier-free formula, since its quan-
tifiers are bounded and ≺ is primitive recursive. Hence, T (s) is Σ01. The bounded
existential quantifier is there in order to make T (s) monotone on k, as the fol-
lowing lemma states. This will be useful later.
Lemma 6.11. For any c : N2 → [r], let T ′ and T be the predicates from Definition
6.10. The following properties hold:
(i) T is an infinite tree.
(ii) Every branch of T is the characteristic function of an initial segment of a
branch of the E-R tree. More precisely, if we have T (s), then we have that
{i : si = 0} is the initial segment of a branch of the E-R tree.
(iii) The following monotonicity conditions hold:
(M1) T ′(s ∗ t, k)→ T ′(s, k).
(M2) T ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, k +m).
Proof. For (i), note that it is clear by definition that T is prefix closed. Also, for
every n there is s : Bn such that T (s), taking simply s such that si = 0 iff i ≺ n.
For (ii), assume T (s) holds. Then T ′(s, k) holds for some k, and so there is
k′ ∈ [|s|, k] such that for all i < |s|, si = 0 iff i ≺ k′. Hence, {i : si = 0} is an
initial segment of pd(k′).
Finally, (iii) is obvious.
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The following lemma uses Π01-AC
0 in order to prove the existence of a function
β which will allow for turning T into a decidable tree.




|s| = n ∧ ∃kT ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
. (def-β)





∃kT ′(s, k)→ ∃mT ′(s,m)
)]
.
Classically we can derive:
∀n∀s
[
|s| = n→ ∃m
(
∃kT ′(s, k)→ T ′(s,m)
)]
.





∃kT ′(s, k)→ T ′(s,m)
)]
.
Finally, since, as we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter, s : B∗ is




|s| = n ∧ ∃kT ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
.
Assuming we are given this function β, our tree T becomes decidable. The
only undecidable element in T was the unbounded existential quantifier on k.
The idea is that β gives us, for each n, a k = βn uniform for every s : Bn.
Corollary 6.13. Given a colouring c : N2 → [r] and a function β : N → N
satisfying (def-β), for each n : N and each s : Bn, T (s) is equivalent to:
T β(s) := T ′(s, βn).
Now we are ready to apply WKL.
Proposition 6.14. Given a colouring c : N2 → [r] and a function β : N → N
satisfying (def-β), let T β be as in Corollary 6.13. There exists an infinite sequence
α : N→ B such that:
∀nT β([α](n)),
i.e.,
∀n∃k ∈ [n, βn] ∀i < n
(
α(i) = 0↔ i ≺ k
)
. (def-α)
Proof. A direct application of WKL(T β).
We need to see now that this infinite branch of T encodes an infinite branch
of the E-R tree, that is, it has infinitely many zeros.
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Proposition 6.15. Given a colouring c : N2 → [r] and a function β : N → N
satisfying (def-β), let α be an infinite sequence as obtained in Proposition 6.14.
Then, α is the characteristic function of an infinite set, i.e., it has infinitely many
zeros. Furthermore, we can construct a function a : N → N such that, for all n,
a(n) is the first k ≥ n with α(k) = 0.
Proof. Given β, we first define an auxiliary function γ : N→ N as γm := βm+1.
For every m, define:
a(m) :=
{
0 if m = 0
k for the least k ∈ [m,β(γr−1(m))] with α(k) = 0.
If we show that a is well-defined, the lemma will follow, since the image of a
is unbounded.
We have that a(0) = 0, and by definition of ≺, α(0) = 0. Let us now
assume m > 0, and let i < m be the greatest such that α(i) = 0. We will find
k0, k1, . . . , kr ∈ N pairwise different such that i ≺ kj for all j = 0, 1, . . . , r.
By (def-α) applied with n := m, there is k0 ∈ [m,βm] such that i ≺ k0.
Applying (def-α) now with n := βm+ 1 = γm, we obtain k1 ∈ [γm, β(γm)] such






such that i ≺ kj for all j = 0, . . . , r. We observe that, by the definition of γ, the
above intervals are all disjoint, and so all kj are different. Now since the E-R tree
is r-ary branching, some of these have to be comparable, i.e., there are j1, j2 such




α(i′) = 0↔ i′ ≺ kj2
)
.
Therefore, α(kj1) = 0, and so, we have, as we required, some k ∈ [m,β(γr−1(m))]
such that α(k) = 0. Thus a is well-defined.
Now that we know that a encodes an infinite branch of the E-R tree, we have
the following:
Corollary 6.16. Given c : N2 → [r] and β : N → N satisfying (def-β), let
a : N → N be as constructed in Proposition 6.15. The set {an : n ∈ N} with the
order < is an infinite min-monochromatic set under the colouring c, i.e., for any
i, j, k : N, if ai < aj < ak, then c(ai, aj) = c(ai, ak).
Proof. By Proposition 6.15 the set is infinite. Moreover, if ai < aj < ak, applying
(def-α) with n := ak + 1, we obtain that ai, aj and ak are ≺-predecessors of the
same node, and therefore by Lemma 6.9, we obtain ai ≺ aj ≺ ak. Now this
implies c(ai, aj) = c(ai, ak).
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In fact, the property of a that we will use is:
∃aNN∀n
(
an ≥ n∧∀i, j, k < n
(
ai < aj∧ai < ak → c(ai, aj) = c(ai, ak)
))
. (def-a)
We can give now a proof of Ramsey’s theorem, which will involve an applica-
tion of IPHP.
Theorem 6.17 (Ramsey’s theorem). For every colouring c : N2 → [r],
∃x[r], FN→N∀k
(
Fk ≥ k ∧ ∀i, j ≤ k
(
Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x
))
.
Proof. We consider the function a defined as above, and so satisfying (def-a). We






We notice that ca(i) is the colour assigned to a pair of two consecutive elements
of the infinite E-R branch under c. By IPHP there is an x : [r] and a p : N → N
such that for all k:
pk ≥ k ∧ ca(pk) = x.
We prove that F := a ◦ p works. We have that F (k) = a(pk) ≥ a(k) ≥ k.
Moreover, if Fi < Fj, we have to see that c(Fi, Fj) = x. Since a(pi) < a(pj),
we have that a(a(pi) + 1) ≤ a(pj), and so, as seen above,
c
(








x = ca(pi) = c
(







6.3 The Dialectica interpretation in action
In order to extract computational information from the classical proof above, a
possible path would be to apply the negative translation and then the Dialectica
interpretation to our theorem, and then proceed as in the proof of soundness to
obtain a term realizing the interpretation. But it turns out that this is totally
unpractical, because of two reasons: first, the classical proof above is by no
means a formal proof of our system of analysis, as writing down all the steps and
details would probably take more pages than this thesis; second, the Dialectica
interpretation of double negated formulas becomes unreadable for human beings,
and one of our aims is to understand the semantics of the interpreted theorem.
So, instead, we present here convenient transformations of the main lemmas
and principles used in the proof. Basically, we apply the negative translation,
then the Dialectica interpretation, and finally we transform the result into another
formula that is more readable.
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The outline of this section is as follows: first we explain in full detail the
transformation announced above in the simple but paradigmatic case of IPHP.
Then we give (this relaxed version of) the interpretation of the other principles
and theorems needed.
Recall that the IPHP states that for every colouring c : N→ [r], we have:
∃x[r], pN→N∀k
(
pk ≥ k ∧ c(pk) = x
)
. (6.2)
First, the negative translation of this is:
¬¬∃x[r], pN→N∀k¬¬
(
pk ≥ k ∧ c(pk) = x
)
.
The Dialectica interpretation of this formula is (supressing double negations
in front of quantifier-free formulas):
∃X([r]→NN→N)→[r], P ([r]→NN→N)→NN∀K [r]→NN→N(
(PK)(K(XK)(PK)) ≥ K(XK)(PK)
∧ c((PK)(K(XK)(PK))) = XK
)
.
We observe that, after applying D, occurrences of x in the matrix of (6.2) have
been replaced by occurrences of XK; of p, by PK; and of k, by K(XK)(PK).
So now, in order to make the dependencies of X and P on K implicit, we
swap the universal and existential quantifier. That is, instead of saying that
there are functionals X and P such that for any value of K, XK and PK satisfy
something, we say that for every value of K there are values x and p satisfying
something. In this step we obtain a weaker formula, since in general we cannot
go back to the previous form without some form of choice. Anyway, it is a matter
of notational convenience, and our proof will give explicit constructions. Here we
also change the name of K to ε, to be consistent with our notation on selection
functions. In doing this, we obtain:
∀ε[r]→NN→N∃x[r], pNN
(
p(εxp) ≥ εxp ∧ c(p(εxp)) = x
)
.
But we have lost important information, because now we are saying that x
and p satisfy the conditions just for one input. To fix this, we come back to
the original IPHP and we consider, for each colouring c : N → [r], the following
equivalent statement:
∃x[r], pN→N∀k∀i ≤ k
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
.
Observe that the bounded quantifier can be encoded as a primitive recursive
function and, therefore, we can consider the formula ∀i ≤ k(pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x)
as quantifier-free. Therefore, after applying Dialectica we obtain:
∃X([r]→NN→N)→[r], P ([r]→NN→N)→NN∀K [r]→NN→N
∀i ≤ K(XK)(PK)
[
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Now, we can take the K out as before, and we obtain:
IPHP(c) : ∀ε[r]→NN→N∃x[r], pNN∀i ≤ εxp
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
.
This is our interpretation of the infinite pigeon-hole principle. The intuition
is that ε tries to give a counterexample to IPHP(c), in the sense that a counterex-
ample to IPHP(c) would be a functional ε : [r] → NN → N such that for every
colour x : [r] and function p : NN, the value εxp tells us ‘x and p fail in some
i ≤ εxp’, i.e., for some i ≤ εxp, pi < i or c(pi) 6= x. But IPHP(c) states that for
every possible counterexample, there are a colour and a set that prove it wrong.
We proceed as in [38] and summarize the results of applying the same kind of
reasoning to other formulas that we be used. From the original
RT2r(c) : ∃x[r], FN→N∀k
(
Fk ≥ k ∧ ∀i, j ≤ k(Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x)
)
,
we get our interpreted version
RT2r(c) : ∀η[r]→N
N→N∃x[r], FNN∀k ≤ ηxF(
Fk ≥ k ∧ ∀i, j ≤ k
(
Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x
))
.
Also, (def-β), which is the key property of β and reads:
∃βNN∀n∀sB∗
(




∀ω̃NN→N, q̃NN→N∃βNN∀n ≤ ω̃β ∀sBn
(
∃k ≤ q̃β T ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
. (def-β)
Proposition 6.14 is interpreted as:
∀ωBN→NN→N∃αBN , βNN∀n ≤ ωαβ T β([α](n)). (def-α)
And finally, (def-a) becomes:
∀ψNN→N∃aNN∀n ≤ ψa(
an ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j, k < n
(




6.4 A constructive proof
Now that all our main results of the previous section are interpreted, the key
observation is that all interpreted statements ask for finite approximations of the
infinite sets whose existence is classically proved, since the inner quantifiers are
bounded and so the properties need to be satisfied over a finite number of inputs.
This section is devoted to extracting from the classical proof of Section 6.2 a
program that computes arbitrarily good approximations to a pairwise monochro-
matic set. The proofs of the theorems will reveal how much of each infinite set
or function (such as α or β) is necessary. Hence, the theorems presented in this
section are versions of those of Section 6.2 that include bounds on the hypotheses.
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6.4.1 Interpreting our application of Π01-AC
0
This subsection is devoted to witnessing (def-β). The following lemma defines
the selection functions that will achieve this.
Lemma 6.18. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring. Define δ := 〈δn〉n∈N, where for
each n ∈ N, δn : JNN is defined as
δnp := p
i(0)
for every p : NN, where i is the least ≤ 2n such that for all s : Bn,
T ′(s, pi+1(0))→ T ′(s, pi(0)).
Then, for every n : N and p : NN, we have:
∀sBn
(
T ′(s, p(δnp))→ T ′(s, δnp)
)
. (6.3)
Proof. We note that (6.3) is obvious once we have established that δn is well-
defined, that is, that such an i exists. Let us proceed by contradiction. Thus,
we assume that for all i ≤ 2n there exists s : Bn such that T ′(s, pi+1(0)) and
¬T ′(s, pi(0)). By (M2), this implies that for all i ≤ 2n, pi(0) ≤ p(pi(0)).
Since there are 2n + 1 possible values for i and only 2n for s, there are by the
assumption i < j such that for the same s : Bn,
T ′(s, pi+1(0)), ¬T ′(s, pi(0));
T ′(s, pj+1(0)), ¬T ′(s, pj(0)).
But since i+ 1 ≤ j, and so pi+1(0) ≤ pj(0), T ′(s, pi+1(0)) and ¬T ′(s, pj(0)) yield
a contradiction.
Now we can prove (def-β) using EPS and the lemma above.
Proposition 6.19 (Interpreted Proposition 6.12). Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring.
Given ω̃, q̃ : NN → N, define δ as in Lemma 6.18 and:
β := EPS0〈〉ω̃δq̃.
Then β satisfies (def-β) applied to ω̃, q̃, that is:
∀n ≤ ω̃β ∀sBn
(
∃k ≤ q̃β T ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
.
Proof. By Theorem 5.3, if n ≤ ω̃β, there is p : NN such that βn = δn(p) and
q̃β = p(δnp). By (6.3), we have:
∀n ≤ ω̃β∀sBn
(
T ′(s, q̃β)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
.
Using (M2), we obtain:
∀n ≤ ω̃β ∀sBn
(
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6.4.2 Interpreting our application of WKL
The aim of this subsection is to prove (def-α):
∀ωBN→NN→N∃αBN , βNN∀n ≤ ωαβ T β([α](n)).
To this end, we will use a sufficient approximation of β.
Definition 6.20. Given a predicate P on B∗, for each n : N we define a predicate:
Depthn(P ) :≡ ∃sB
n
P (s).
In order to satisfy (def-α), given ω : BN → NN → N, we will first build α : BN










Also, Lemma 6.21 below will establish Depthωαβ(T
β), and so applying (6.4)
ωαβ times, we will obtain Depth0(T
β([α](ωαβ))), that is, T β([α](ωαβ)), and so,
we will have (def-α).
The key fact is that the construction of an approximation of α does not require
the whole β to be constructed, since it will need just a finite number of calls to
β. Hence, given ω, there are concrete ω̃, q̃ such that the β obtained applying
(def-β) to them is sufficient for approximating α up to ωαβ. We will give explicit
expressions for ω̃, q̃ by inspecting the following proofs: more precisely, we will pay
attention to how much of β is used and, as in [38], we will highlight every use of it
with a box . Lemmas 6.21 and 6.23 and Proposition 6.26 assume the existence of
an (ineffective) β satisfying (def-β). Each one of these Lemmas and Proposition
is followed respectively by Corollary 6.22, 6.24 and 6.27, which are counterparts
that assume just an approximation of β: these corollaries define explicit ω̃ and q̃
using the bounds found in the proof of their corresponding Lemma or Proposition,
and then give a bounded version thereof for the approximation of β satisfying:
∀n ≤ ω̃β ∀sBn
(
∃k ≤ q̃β T ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
. (6.5)
Lemma 6.21. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring, and assume that β is a function
satisfying (def-β). The tree T β has branches of arbitrary length, i.e., for all m : N
there exists s : Bm such that T β(s).
Proof. Recall that:
T β(s) = T ′(s, β|s|) = ∃k′ ∈ [|s|, β|s|] ∀i < |s|(si = 0↔ i ≺ k′).
Given m, define s : Bm as for all i < m, si = 0 iff i ≺ m. This implies T ′(s,m).
Therefore, by (def-β) with n = m and k = m , we have T ′(s, βm).





Let β be as in Proposition 6.19, hence satisfying (6.5). For any j ≤ m, the tree
T β has branches of length j, i.e., for all there exists s : Bj such that T β(s).
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Proof. The same proof of Lemma 6.21, replacing the use of (def-β) with (6.5).
Recall that by the notation T βs we mean that, given t : B∗, T βs (t) = T β(s ∗ t).
Lemma 6.23. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring and suppose that β : N → N
satisfies (def-β). For each s : B∗, define the selection function εs : JNB by, for



















Proof. Fix s and p and assume Depthp(εsp)+1(T
β






holds, then εsp = 0 and we are done.
If not, then we have
Depthp(0)+1(T
β
s ) ∧ ¬Depthp(0)(T
β
s∗0)
and εsp = 1. But then, the assumption Depthp(εsp)+1(T
β
s ) says Depthp(1)+1(T
β
s ).










We consider two cases:
Case 1. p(0) ≥ p(1).
By (ii) and (iii) we have Depthp(0)(T
β
s∗1). Therefore, there is t
′ : Bp(0)
such that T ′(s ∗ 1 ∗ t′, β(m+ 1 + p(0))). By (M1), since p(0) ≥ p(1),
we obtain t : Bp(1) such that T ′(s ∗ 1 ∗ t, β(m+ 1 + p(0))). Applying
(def-β) with n = m+ 1 + p(1) and k = β(m+ 1 + p(0)) , we obtain
∃tBp(1)T ′(s ∗ 1 ∗ t, β(m+ 1 + p(1))),
which is equivalent to Depthp(1)(T
β
s∗1).
Case 2. p(0) < p(1).
Applying (def-β) with n = m+ 1 + p(0) and k = β(m+ 1 + p(1)) ,
together with (iii) we obtain:
∀tBp(0)¬T ′(s ∗ 0 ∗ t, β(m+ 1 + p(1))).
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Then by (M1) again,
∀tBp(1)¬T ′(s ∗ 0 ∗ t, β(m+ 1 + p(1))).
which is equivalent to ¬Depthp(1)(T
β
s∗0). By (i) we get Depthp(1)(T
β
s∗1).
Now we give a version of this Lemma that does not require the whole β to be
constructed, using the bounds on n and k from (def-β) that we have indicated
with a box.
Corollary 6.24. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring. Given m : N and p : B → N,
define for any β : N→ N:
ω̃β := m+ 1 + max{p(0), p(1)},
q̃β := maxi≤ω̃β βi.
(6.7)
Fix β as the one obtained from Proposition 6.19, i.e., β satisfies (6.5) with ω̃, q̃










Proof. The proof of Lemma 6.23 works, again replacing (def-β) with (6.5).
We now use these facts to construct α. First we need the following definition:
Definition 6.25. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring. Given ω : BN → NN → N and
β : NN, define the function q : BN → N as, for each α : BN,
qα := ωαβ − n− 1,
where n < ωαβ is the least refuting (6.4), and ωαβ − 1 if no such n exists.
The following proposition states the existence of our α assuming the (inef-
fective) existence of a function β satisfying (def-β). Throughout its proof, we
highlight the uses of the lemmas above.
Proposition 6.26. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring and suppose that β : N → N
satisfies (def-β). Given ω : BN → NN → N, consider ωβ := λα.ωαβ. Let q be as
in Definition 6.25 and ε as in Lemma 6.23. The sequence:
α := EPS0〈〉ωβεq
satisfies T β([α](ωβα)).
Proof. By Theorem 5.3, we know that α and p[α](n) as defined in the theorem, for
n ≤ ωβα, satisfy:
αn = ε[α](n)p[α](n),
qα = p[α](n)(ε[α](n)p[α](n)).

















Assume towards a contradiction that (6.4) does not hold. Then, qα = ωβα−n−1
















a contradiction. Therefore, there is no n refuting (6.4), and so it holds.
Since by Lemma 6.21 we have Depthωβα(T
β) (that is, we take m = ωβα ),





Corollary 6.27. Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring. Given ω : BN → NN → N and
β : N → N, consider ωβ := λα.ωαβ. Let q be as in Definition 6.25 and ε as in
Lemma 6.23. Define:
α := EPS0〈〉ωβεq.
If β satisfies (6.5) for:
ω̃β := max{ωβα, |ωβα− qα− 1|+ max{ps(0), ps(1)}+ 1},
q̃β := max{ωβα,maxi≤ω̃β βi},
(6.9)
then we have T β([α](ωβα)).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 6.26 works, replacing the use of Lemma 6.21 with
Corollary 6.22 and of Lemma 6.23 with Corollary 6.24.
Now we are ready to arrange all contents of this subsection into a proof of
(def-α).
Theorem 6.28 (Interpreted Proposition 6.14). Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring.
We have (def-α), i.e., for every ω : BN → NN → N, there exist α : BN and β : NN
such that ∀n ≤ ωαβ T β([α](n)).
Proof. Fix ω. For any β : NN, let β 7→ αβ denote the construction of α from
Corollary 6.27. Consider ω̃ and q̃ as in (6.9). There is no circularity here, since
ω̃β, q̃β depend on β and on the α = αβ constructed from β, not on the particular
α satisfying (def-α) that we are aiming to build now. Once and for all, fix β as
the one obtained from Proposition 6.19 using ω̃, q̃. And now, fix α = αβ. These α
and β satisfy the theorem. By Corollary 6.27, we have T β([α](ωαβ)). If n ≤ ωαβ,
then by (M1) we obtain T ′([α](n), β(ωαβ)). Finally, by (6.5) with k = β(ωαβ),
we obtain T ′([α](n), βn) = T β([α](n)), and so we are done.
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The last step of this part of the proof is to prove (def-a):
Proposition 6.29 (Interpreted Proposition 6.15). Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring.
For all ψ : NN → N there exists a function a : NN such that for all n ≤ ψa,
an ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j, k < n
(
ai < aj ∧ ai < ak → c(ai, aj) = c(ai, ak)
)
.
Proof. For each α : BN and β : NN, define aα,β as in Proposition 6.15:
aα,β(m) :=

0 if m = 0
k for the least k ∈ [m,β(γr−1(m))] with α(k) = 0
0 if there is no such k.
We take care of this last case because now α and β are arbitrary, and so a k
as in the second case may not exist.
Now, define ω : BN → NN → N as, for all α : BN and β : NN,
ωαβ := maxi≤ψ(aα,β)
(
max{γji | 0 ≤ j ≤ r}
)
,
and define α and β as in Theorem 6.28. Then a = aα,β satisfies our proposition,
the proof being the same as in Proposition 6.15, since that proof uses the fact
T β([α](n)) only for n < ωαβ as defined above.
6.4.3 Interpreting our application of IPHP
Theorem 6.30 (IPHP(c)). Let c : N→ [r] be a colouring. We have:
∀ε[r]→NN→N∃x[r], pNN∀i ≤ εxp
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
.
Proof. Given ε : [r]→ NN → N, for each x : [r] and p : NN define ε̃xp as the least
i ≤ εxp refuting
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x,
if such an i exists, and as εxp, if not.
Let







and let N = max{k0, . . . , kr−1}. By Theorem 5.3 (with constant control function
λsN
N
.(r − 1)), there are p0, . . . , pr−1 such that for every x : [r],
kx = ε̃xpx, N = px(kx).
Let x := c(N) and p := px. If there were an i ≤ εxp satisfying
¬
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
,
then we would have p(ε̃xp) < ε̃xp or c(p(ε̃xp)) 6= x. But this is not the case, since
p(ε̃xp) = pxkx = N ≥ kx
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and




pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
,
and we are done.
Finally, we present the proof of the interpreted Ramsey theorem.
Theorem 6.31 (Interpreted Ramsey theorem). Let c : N2 → [r] be a colouring.
For any η : [r]→ JNN, there exist F : NN and x : [r] such that:
∀k ≤ ηxF
(
Fk ≥ k ∧ ∀i, j ≤ k
(
Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x
))
.
Proof. Let c and η be fixed. For any a : NN, define a colouring ca : N → [r]
as ca(i) := c(ai, a(ai + 1)). Define εa : [r] → NN → N as εaxp := ηx(a ◦ p). By
IPHP(c), there are xa : [r] and pa : NN such that:
∀i ≤ εaxapa
(
pai ≥ i ∧ c(pai) = xa
)
. (6.10)
Now define ψ : NN → N as
ψa := maxi≤εaxapa p
ai.
By Proposition 6.29, there exists a : NN such that for all n ≤ ψa we have
an ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j, k < n
(
ai < aj ∧ ai < ak → c(ai, aj) = c(ai, ak)
)
. (6.11)
Now take F := a ◦ pa and x := xa. Let k ≤ ηxF = εaxpa. Then pak ≤ ψa and we
have:





Moreover, if i, j ≤ k and Fi < Fj, we have to see that c(Fi, Fj) = x. Since
a(pai) < a(paj), we have that a(a(pai) + 1) ≤ a(paj), and so, by (6.11),
c
(








x = ca(pai) = c
(
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6.5 Summary of the construction
The input is a colouring c : N2 → [r] and a functional η : [r] → NN → N.
Throughout this section, we use superscripts to denote parametrization: for in-
stance, the construction of xa : [r] builds a colour from any a : NN. We do not




ω : BN → NN → N
ω̃ : NN → N
q̃ : NN → N
Also, recall the definitions of the following predicates:
T ′(s, k) := ∃k′ ∈ [|s|, k] ∀i < |s|(si = 0↔ i ≺ k′)
T β(s) := T ′(s, βn)
Depthn(P ) := ∃sB
n
P (s)
(A) Construction of xa : [r] and F a : NN (Theorems 6.30, 6.31).
Define ca(i) := c
(
ai, a(ai + 1)
)
and εaxp := ηx(a ◦ p). For each x : [r] and
p : NN define ε̃axp as the least i ≤ εaxp refuting
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x,
if such an i exists, and as εaxp, if not. Let







Na := max{k0, . . . , kr−1}, and xa := ca(N).
Also, we give the explicit construction of the p0, . . . , pr−1 given by Theorem
5.3. For any k : N,
par−1(k) := max{k0, . . . , kr−2, k}
and for i < r − 1,
pai (k) := max{k0, . . . , ki−1, k, kki+1, . . . , kkr−1},





λk′i+1, . . . , k
′
r−1.max{k0, . . . , ki−1, k, k′i+1, . . . , k′r−1}
)
.
Define F a := a ◦ paxa .
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(B) Construction of βω̃,q̃ : NN (Subsection 6.4.1).
Let δ : N → JNN be defined as δnp := pi(0) where i ≤ 2n is the least such
that for all s : Bn, T ′(s, pi+1(0))→ T ′(s, pi(0)). Define:
βω̃,q̃ := EPS0〈〉ω̃δq̃.
(C) Construction of αβ,ω : BN (Results 6.21–6.26).
Define ωβ = λα.ωαβ and q
β,ω : BN → NN → N as:
qβ,ωα := ωαβ − n− 1










and ωαβ − 1 if no such n exists.











(D) Construction of βω : NN using (B) and (C) (Corollary 6.27).
Define, for each β : NN,
ω̃ωβ := max{ωβαβ,ω, |ωβαβ,ω − qβ,ωαβ,ω − 1|+ max{ps(0), ps(1)}+ 1},
q̃ωβ := max{ωβαβ,ω,maxi≤ω̃β βi},
where:
s := [αβ,ω](ωαβ,ωβ − qβ,ωαβ,ω − 1),
ps(x) := EPS|s|+1(s ∗ x)ωβεβ(qβ,ωs∗x).
Define βω := βω̃
ω ,q̃ω .
(E) Construction of αω : NN using (C) and (D) (Theorem 6.28).
Define αω := αβ
ω ,ω.
(F) Construction of aα,β : NN (Proposition 6.29).
Define γm := βm+ 1 and:
aα,β(m) :=

0 if m = 0
k for the least k ∈ [m,β(γr−1(m))] with α(k) = 0
0 if there is no such k.
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(G) Construction of ω : BN → NN → N using (A) and (F) (Prop. 6.29).
Define ψ : NN → N as, for each a : NN,
ψa := maxi≤ηxa (a◦pa) p
ai.
Define ω as, for each α : BN and β : NN,
ωαβ := maxi≤ψaα,β(max{γji | 0 ≤ j ≤ r}).
(H) Construction of α : BN and β : NN using (D), (E) and (G) (Th. 6.28).
Define β := βω and α := αω.
(I) Construction of a : NN using (H) (Proposition 6.29).
Define a := aα,β.
(J) Construction of x and F using (A) and (I) (Theorem 6.31).
Define x := xa and F := F a.
6.6 A game-theoretic reading of the proof
Each use of EPS in the proof above gives an optimal strategy in some sequential
game. In this section we explain what games arise from the interpretations and
how an optimal strategy solves them.
6.6.1 The game behind Π01-AC
0
The aim is to witness (def-β):
∀ω̃NN→N, q̃NN→N∃βNN∀n ≤ ω̃β ∀sBn
(
∃k ≤ q̃β T ′(s, k)→ T ′(s, βn)
)
.
Let us think of ω̃ as a control function and of q̃ as an outcome function. Then,
what we want is a sequence of moves β such that, for n up to ω̃β, all sequences
s of length n which are witnessed by q̃β, i.e., T ′(s, q̃β), are also witnessed by the
move at round n, i.e., T ′(s, βn).
To this end, given ω̃, q̃, our game is given by (q̃, δ, ω̃), where δ is defined as in




T ′(s, p(k))→ T ′(s, k)
)
,
that is, for each n, all branches of length n that have as a witness the outcome
p(k) are already witnessed by the move k. It may be seen as a no-new-branches
strategy.
We have seen that β as defined in Proposition 6.19 is an optimal play in the
game and satisfies our requirements.
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6.6.2 The game behind WKL
The aim is, given ω : BN → NN → N and a sufficient approximation of β (which
is computed via the above game), to find α : BN satisfying:
∀n ≤ ωβα T β([α](n)). (6.12)
where recall that ωβ := λα.ωαβ.
Let us think of ω as a control function. What we want is a sequence α that
encodes a branch of the tree up to ωβα.
To this end, our selection funtions will have to pick 0 or 1 at each round,
depending on which of them can be extended to a sufficiently long branch. Our
game is given by (q, ε, ω), where q is as in Definition 6.25 and ε is as in Lemma
6.23. We notice that the set of possible moves at each round is here B.
Recall that q is defined as, for each α : BN,
qα := ωβα− n− 1,









if it exists, and ωαβ − 1 if not. So, basically, qα says how much of α is missing
for satisfying (6.12), in the sense that, if α satisfies (6.12), then qα = 0, and if






The strategy that ε implements is the following: if we have already constructed
the initial segment of a branch, say s, then εsp tries to satisfy Depthp(εsp)(T
β
s∗εsp),
i.e., it picks a boolean b such that if we know that s can be extended to a branch
of length |s|+ 1 + p(b), then s ∗ b still can.
Since T β is infinite, the empty sequence 〈〉 extends to a branch of length ωβα,
and that is exactly what α, defined as an optimal play of the game, accomplishes.
6.6.3 The game behind IPHP
The aim is to witness:
∀ε[r]→NN→N∃x[r], pNN∀i ≤ εxp
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
.
Recall the intuition: ε tries to give a counterexample to IPHP, in the sense
that a counterexample to IPHP would be a functional ε : [r]→ NN → N such that
for every colour x : [r] and function p : NN, the value εxp tells us ‘x and p fail
in some i ≤ εxp’, i.e., for some i ≤ εxp, pi < i or c(pi) 6= x. But IPHP(c) states
that for every possible counterexample, there is a colour and a set that prove it
wrong.
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So given ε : [r] → NN → N, for each x : [r] and p : NN define ε̃xp as the least
i ≤ εxp refuting
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x,
if such an i exists, and as εxp, if not. This ε̃ tries to find the first place where x
and p fail.
Our game is an r-round game, which is the same as an unbounded game
whose control is constant r. So consider the game (max, ε̃, r). Then we compute
an optimal play 〈k0, . . . , kr−1〉, whose outcome is N = max{k0, . . . , kn−1}. For
each colour (round) x, kx is, if it exists, the first place where x and px (as defined
in the proof of Theorem 6.30) fail. But then we have seen that for x := c(N) and
p := px, we must have:
p(ε̃xp) ≥ ε̃xp ∧ c(p(ε̃xp)) = x,
so ε̃ fails to find a counterexample to x and p, and hence we necessarily have:
∀i ≤ εxp
(
pi ≥ i ∧ c(pi) = x
)
.
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Future work
Proof mining is a relatively young field, and as such there is an eager search
for new applications. It would be interesting to find more theorems of classical
analysis for term extraction, but also to revisit some performed term extractions
via bar recursion in order to understand the meaning of the constructive proof in
game-theoretic terms.
In [11], selection functions are studied within the context of category theory.
A development of the study of the interaction of category theory with selection
functions could lead to obtaining sufficient conditions for the existence of selection
functions associated to families of quantifiers. It could also be a starting point
for finding more applications of the product of selection functions in the realm of
general mathematics and computer science.
Moreover, there are variants of EPS that are capable of witnessing variants
of the Dialectica interpretation, for instance, the monotone variant. There are
some open questions [13] regarding the equivalence between several forms of the
product of selection functions and bar recursion.
Regarding Ramsey’s theorem, our presentation treats only the case of colour-
ings of pairs. Since the classical proof of Ramsey’s theorem for sets of k numbers,
with k ≥ 2, uses the instance of Ramsey’s theorem for sets of k− 1 numbers, the
proof mining for the general case, or even for the case k = 3, supposes a chal-
lenge. We would be interested in studying these cases, and if possible, obtaining
a general algorithm with k as an input.
It would also be interesting to program the extracted algorithm for the inter-
pretation of Ramsey’s theorem in a functional programming language, such as
OCaml, Haskell, or Agda.
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[28] Andréi Kolmogorov. On the principle of excluded middle. Translation of
Russian original in [47]. 1925.
[29] Georg Kreisel. On the interpretation of non-finitist proofs – Part I. The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 16(4):241–267, 1951.
[30] Georg Kreisel. On the interpretation of non-finitist proofs – Part II. The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 17(1):43–58, 1952.
[31] Georg Kreisel. Hilbert’s programme. Dialectica, 12(3-4):346–372, 1958.
[32] Georg Kreisel. Mathematical significance of consistency proofs. The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 23(2):155–182, 1958.
[33] Georg Kreisel. Interpretation of analysis by means of constructive functionals
of finite types. In Constructivity in Mathematics, pages 101–128. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1959.
[34] Georg Kreisel and Anne S. Troelstra. Formal systems for some branches of
intuitionistic analysis. Annals of mathematical logic, 1(3):229–387, 1970.
[35] Sigekatu Kuroda. Intuitionistische Untersuchungen der formalistischen
Logik. Nagoya Mathematical Journal, 2:35–47, 1951.
[36] Horst Luckhardt. Bounds extracted by Kreisel from ineffective proofs. In
P. Odifreddi, editor, Kreiseliana: about and around Georg Kreisel. 1999.
[37] Paulo Oliva. Proof Mining in Subsystems of Analysis. PhD thesis, 2003.
[38] Paulo Oliva and Thomas Powell. A constructive interpretation of Ramsey’s
theorem via the product of selection functions. Mathematical structures in
computer science, 25(8):1755–1778, 2015.
[39] Paulo Oliva and Thomas Powell. A game-theoretic computational interpre-
tation of proofs in classical analysis. In R. Kahle and M. Rathjen, editors,
Gentzen’s Centenary, pages 501–531. Springer, 2015.
[40] Thomas Powell. On Bar Recursive Interpretations of Analysis. PhD thesis,
Queen Mary University of London, 2013.
[41] Frank P. Ramsey. On a problem of formal logic. In Classic Papers in Com-
binatorics, pages 1–24. Springer, 2009.
[42] Morten Heine Sørensen and Pawel Urzyczyn. Lectures on the Curry-Howard
isomorphism, volume 149. Elsevier, 2006.
100
[43] Clifford Spector. Provably recursive functionals of analysis: a consistency
proof of analysis by an extension of principles formulated in current intu-
itionistic mathematics. Recursive function theory, pages 1–27, 1962.
[44] Anne S. Troelstra. Metamathematical investigation of intuitionistic arith-
metic and analysis, volume 344. Springer Science & Business Media, 1973.
[45] Anne S. Troelstra. Introductory note to 1958 and 1972. Kurt Gödel Collected
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